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INTRODUCTION
Should Congress exempt smaller reporting companies from Section
404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”)? 1 Section 404, 2 which
is arguably the most controversial of SOX’s provisions, 3 requires reporting companies (i.e., companies that are subject to the public reporting
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4 the “Exchange
Act”) to take greater responsibility for their internal control over financial reporting (“ICFR”). 5 Specifically, Section 404 requires that (i) a
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered Sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX].
2. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2002).
3. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT
(Nov. 30, 2006) 115 [hereinafter CCMR REPORT] (“The main policy debate over SOX
. . . is focused on the implementation of a single provision, Section 404 . . . .”).
4. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006)) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
5. Section 404 does not use the phrase “internal control over financial reporting,”
but instead refers to a company’s “internal control structure and procedures for financial
reporting.” SOX §§ Section 404(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a), (b) (2002). To provide
greater clarity to the concept, the SEC adopted and defined the term “internal control
over financial reporting” in its rules implementing Section 404. Final Rule:
Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification
of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Release Nos. 33-8238; 34-47986; IC26068 (June 5, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm
[hereinafter SEC Release 33-8238]. The SEC amended rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) of
the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(f) and § 240.15d-15(f), to define “internal
control over financial reporting” as:
[a] process designed by, or under the supervision of, the registrant’s principal
executive and financial officers, or persons performing similar functions, and effected
by the registrant’s board of directors, management and other personnel, to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles and includes those policies and procedures that:
(1) Pertain to the maintenance of records that in reasonable detail accurately and
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the registrant;
(2) Provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to
permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the registrant are being
made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the
registrant; and
(3) Provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of
unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition of the registrant’s assets that could
have a material effect on the financial statements.

17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-15(f), 240.15d-15(f) (2007).
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reporting company’s management annually assess and publicly disclose
the effectiveness of the company’s ICFR 6 , and (ii) the company’s outside auditor attest to that assessment. 7
The primary objective for Section 404 is presumably to improve the
accuracy of financial disclosure by requiring companies to maintain
effective ICFRs. 8 The controversy surrounding Section 404, however,
has not focused on the provision’s underlying objective, 9 but rather on
whether the substantial compliance costs involved with Section 404 exceed the statute’s benefits. 10 In its June 2003 release adopting the implementation rules for Section 404, 11 the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the “SEC”) estimated that the annual cost for Section 404
compliance would run $91,000 per company. 12 Subsequent studies have
shown, however, that the actual cost is exponentially greater than the
6.
7.
8.
9.

SOX § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. 7262(a) (2002).
Id. § 7262(b).
CCMR REPORT, supra note 3, at 119.
Id. at 115. Note, however, that the CCMR Report states a slightly different
objective for Section 404 than is proposed by this Article, as the CCMR Report focuses
more on a possible public perception goal. The CCMR Report states that Section 404
“is aimed at reducing the market impact from accounting ‘errors’ – whether from fraud,
inadvertent misstatements, or omissions – by assuring investors that public companies
maintain effective controls over financial reporting.” Id.
10. See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY
DEBACLE – WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 38-42, 53-55, 82-85 (2006);
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SARBANES-OXLEY 4-7, 247-50
(2007) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE GUIDE TO SOX]; Ehud Kamar et al., Sarbanes-Oxley’s
Effects on Small Firms: What is the Evidence? 2 (USC CLEO Research Paper No. C079, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=993198; Robert A. Prentice, SarbanesOxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 72557 (2007); William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public after Sarbanes-Oxley: The
Irony of “Going Private”, 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 141-43 (2006); CCMR Report, supra
note 3, at 115.
11. SEC Release 33-8238, supra note 5.
12. Id. The SEC described its methodology for its estimate as follows:
This estimate is based on the estimated total burden hours of 5,396,266 [divided by
14,000 companies, results in roughly 385 hours per company], an assumed 75%/25%
split of the burden hours between internal staff and external professionals, and an
hourly rate of $200 for internal staff time and $300 for external professionals. The
hourly cost estimate is based on consultations with several registrants and law firms
and other persons who regularly assist registrants in preparing and filing periodic
reports with the Commission. Our PRA estimate does not reflect any additional cost
burdens that a company will incur as a result of having to obtain an auditor’s
attestation on management’s internal control report.

Id. at n.174.
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SEC’s initial estimate. 13 Far from a slight additional regulatory cost,
reporting companies could be spending more to comply with Section
404 than on any other SOX provision. 14 The fact that a regulation generates substantial compliance costs, however, is not by itself problematic. Rather, a problem arises when a regulation generates substantial
compliance costs without generating benefits that equal or exceed those
costs. Specifically, if Section 404 imposed substantial compliance costs
accompanied by benefits to companies and their shareholders that
exceeded those costs, then Section 404 would be “cost-effective” and
should be considered a beneficial regulation. If Section 404 generated
benefits that are less than its substantial compliance costs, however, then
Section 404 would be “cost-ineffective.”
Currently, there is no consensus on the cost-effectiveness of Section
15
404. Critics of the statute decry that Section 404 “has gone too far”16
and point to: (1) the substantial compliance costs, reasoning that it is
unrealistic to expect that Section 404 generates sufficient benefits to offset those costs; and (2) anecdotal evidence that suggests smaller reporting companies are employing strategies to avoid being subject to Section
404. 17 Conversely, proponents for Section 404 tend to focus on the
beneficial impact that Section 404 should have on investor protection
and on an issuer’s cost of capital by improving financial disclosure
accuracy. 18
If Section 404 turns out to be cost-ineffective, the companies that
are most threatened are smaller companies, as cost-ineffective regulations tend to disproportionately harm smaller companies. 19 At the same
time, certain classes of smaller companies have proven to be particularly
13.
14.

See discussion infra Part III.B.
Cynthia A. Glassman, SEC Comm’r, Internal Controls Over Financial
Reporting – Putting Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 in Perspective, Speech Before the 12th
Annual CFO Summit (May 8, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2006/spch050806cag.htm.
15. CCMR REPORT, supra note 3, at 115.
16. See, e.g., John Stossel, Sarbanes-Oxley has Gone Too Far, JFS PRODUCTIONS,
INC., Dec. 21, 2005, available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/Commentary/com-12
_21_05_JS.html.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
18. See, e.g., Charles D. Niemeier, Bd. Member, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., American Competitiveness in International Capital Markets (Sept. 30, 2006),
available at http://www.pcaobus.org/News_and_Events/Events/2006/Speech/09-30_
Niemeier.aspx.
19. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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valuable to the U.S. economy by creating a disproportionate amount of
the innovations, macroeconomic growth, and net new jobs in the United
States. 20 These two premises, taken together, argue for federal policymakers to be extremely cautious before imposing potentially cost-ineffective regulations like Section 404 on smaller companies. At the same
time, however, smaller reporting companies – and the investors who
tend to invest in them – may also have the greatest need for the services
provided by Section 404, 21 which would argue against granting smaller
reporting companies relief from Section 404.
In the face of this uncertainty, what should federal policymakers
do? To date, the SEC has not ignored Section 404’s potential negative
impact on smaller companies. It has chosen to implement Section 404
slowly to allow for a learning curve to develop on how best to implement the Section 404 process before requiring smaller reporting
companies to comply. 22 The SEC has also tried to make management’s
and auditors’ evaluations of ICFRs more effective and efficient – and
thereby less expensive – by amending the rules relating to management’s evaluation of ICFR, issuing interpretative guidance that management can use as a safe harbor in its evaluation of ICFRs, and adopting
new auditing standards. 23 In February 2008, the SEC announced an
additional delay of Section 404’s auditor attestation requirement for the
smallest reporting companies (i.e., non-accelerated filers, which generally speaking are those with worldwide public equity floats of less than
$75 million) 24 , so that the SEC can study the cost-benefit impact of that
auditor attestation requirement for smaller companies. 25 The auditor
attestation requirement will therefore not become mandatory for these
smallest reporting companies until they file their annual reports for the
fiscal year ending on or after December 15, 2009. 26

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See discussion infra Part II.B.
Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 9-11, 27.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
Id.
The term “non-accelerated filer” is not defined in the Exchange Act. Instead,
the term “non-accelerated filer” captures issuers that are not “large accelerated filers” or
“accelerated filers” as defined in rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2
(2008).
25. SEC Begins Small Business Costs and Benefit Study of Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Section 404, Release No. 2008-8 (Feb. 1, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2008/2008-8.htm.
26. SEC Approves One-Year Extension for Small Businesses From Auditor
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This Article considers whether Congress and the SEC should go
further and exempt smaller reporting companies altogether from Section
404 compliance. Such exemption could come in a number of different
forms – from complete exemption from Section 404, to allowing smaller
reporting companies the ability to opt out of Section 404, to granting
smaller reporting companies relief from the auditor attestation portion of
Section 404. 27 These exemption requests do have some appeal, as they
suggest a market-based resolution to the uncertain value of Section 404
for smaller reporting companies. In each case, smaller reporting companies would be relieved (either substantially or completely) from mandatory compliance with Section 404, but would retain the ability to
voluntarily choose to more fully comply with Section 404 if they found
it to be cost-effective. Rather than debate the cost-effectiveness of
Section 404, these Section 404 relief proposals appear to provide a
definitive mechanism for answering the cost-benefit question simply by
allowing investors to express their demand (or lack of demand) for the
services provided by Section 404 through the price they pay for
securities.
While empowering smaller reporting companies with such marketbased regulatory solutions might seem appealing at first glance, this
Article explains why structural factors within the public securities
markets for smaller reporting companies will prevent such market-based
proposals from accurately determining the net effect of Section 404.
Instead, exempting smaller reporting companies from Section 404 is
likely to significantly increase the information asymmetry between
smaller reporting companies and their investors. This outcome would be
particularly problematic since unsophisticated, ordinary investors (rather
than institutional investors) are the predominant external shareholders
for smaller reporting companies and ordinary shareholders have historically demonstrated themselves to be vulnerable to just this type of
information asymmetry. 28 This Article constructs a model for analyzing
the probable impact of granting Section 404 relief to smaller reporting
companies and concludes that making Section 404 voluntary for smaller
reporting companies would almost certainly guarantee an insufficient

Attestation Requirement in Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Release No. 2008-16 (June 20, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-116.htm [hereinafter SEC
Release 2008-16].
27. See discussion infra Part V.A.
28. See infra Part V.C.2.
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amount of investment by those companies in their ICFR, with the cost
for that insufficient dedication of resources to ICFR being borne primarily and unknowingly by unsophisticated, ordinary investors.
This Article recommends, therefore, that smaller reporting companies be subject to the same Section 404 requirements as large companies
and that Congress resist calls to grant substantial Section 404 relief to
smaller reporting companies. Further, this Article advocates that smaller
reporting companies be required to become fully Section 404 compliant
as soon as practicable.
In furtherance of these propositions, this Article proceeds as
follows: Part I provides an overview of Section 404 and its intended
benefits. Part II then considers the special attributes of smaller companies that might warrant their receiving particular attention from policymakers. Part III examines the evidence regarding Section 404’s substantial compliance costs. Part IV sifts through evidence on the benefits that
derive from Section 404 and examines the Section’s probable net effect,
including an examination of certain post-SOX trends that could indicate
that Section 404 is cost-ineffective, such as: (1) an increase in “goingdark” transactions, (2) a decrease in U.S. IPOs by smaller companies,
and (3) an increase in IPOs on foreign stock markets by smaller U.S.
companies. Part IV also explains why, in spite of the anecdotal evidence, Section 404’s net effect on smaller reporting companies remains
unclear. Part V examines the market-based proposals to exempt smaller
reporting companies from Section 404 and provides a model for analyzing the probable impact of granting Section 404 relief to smaller
reporting companies. Finally, Part VI offers a conclusion as well as
some cautionary qualifications.
PART I: SECTION 404 AND ITS INTENDED BENEFITS
A. Basic Statutory Requirement
For the all the controversy it has stirred, Section 404 is a relatively
straightforward statute. It consists of two provisions. The first, Section
404(a), 29 requires that each annual report filed by a reporting company
contain an “internal control report” 30 that:

29.
30.

SOX § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2002).
Id.
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(1) “state[s] the responsibility of management for establishing and
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting;” 31 and
(2) “contain[s] an assessment, as of the end of the most recent
fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal
control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial
reporting.” 32
In short, management must identify, understand and assess the
company’s internal systems for gathering and evaluating the information
needed to generate accurate financial reports, 33 and disclose any
“material weaknesses” 34 in the company’s ICFR. Section 404 focuses
specifically on ICFR, which is defined as:
[A] process designed by, or under the supervision of, the issuer’s
principal executive and financial officers, or persons performing
similar functions, and effected by the issuer’s board of directors,
management and other personnel, to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of
financial statements for external purposes in accordance with
35
generally accepted accounting principles.

The process must include policies and procedures for maintaining
accurate accounting records, ensuring that receipts and expenditures are
made only in accordance with management authorization, and safeguarding assets. 36
The second provision, Section 404(b), 37 inserts an external monitor
to help ensure the accuracy of the Section 404(a) internal control report.
Specifically, Section 404(b) requires that the company’s registered public accounting firm that audited the financial statements included in the

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
See BAINBRIDGE GUIDE TO SOX, supra note 10, at 198.
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.308(a)(3). “Management is not permitted to
conclude that the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting is effective if
there are one or more material weaknesses in the registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting.” Id.
35. Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) & 15d-15(f), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-15(f),
240.15d-15(f).
36. Id.
37. SOX § 404(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2002).
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annual report “attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the
management of the issuer.” 38
B. Intended Benefits
Overall, SOX involves a broad range of corporate governance
reforms that were meant to improve investor protection and increase the
efficiency of the U.S. public securities markets, primarily by increasing
the disclosure requirements of reporting companies and establishing
stronger standards for: (i) reporting company directors and senior
management; (ii) public auditors; and (iii) investment banks. 39 Why did
Congress decide to include in this batch of reforms a requirement that
reporting companies enhance their ICFR? And more importantly, does
an increased regulatory focus on internal controls significantly improve
financial reporting? The true answer to this latter question is that
nobody really knows, as little research has been conducted on the
efficacy of mandatory internal controls. 40
The fact that nobody really knows whether mandatory internal
control requirements such as Section 404 are a valuable regulatory
approach does not mean that they cannot be valuable. It simply means
that the case has yet to be proved. Theoretically, requiring companies to
improve their ICFR “should” improve the quality of financial reporting,
which should in turn increase social welfare, so long as the cost of these
enhanced requirements does not exceed their benefit. Before addressing
the cost-benefit issue, it is useful to understand the benefits that one
should expect to flow from Section 404, if it works as intended.
1. More Accurate Financial Reporting
The primary objective of Section 404 is (presumably) to improve
the accuracy of the financial disclosure made by reporting companies.
The Exchange Act imposes substantial reporting obligations on report-

38.
39.

Id.
For a thorough discussion of the various requirements of SOX, see BAINBRIDGE
GUIDE TO SOX, supra note 10.
40. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 145 (2006). “Some critics suspect that this new emphasis on internal
controls has become a knee-jerk regulatory response that is empty of actual content,
serving a function more symbolic than substantive.” Id.
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ing companies, 41 including extensive disclosure of the company’s
financial data. 42 This financial reporting obligation is ultimately discharged by the company’s senior management (e.g., its chief executive
officer (“CEO”), its chief financial officer (“CFO”), and, to a lesser
extent, its board of directors). Unfortunately, there is a significant risk
that those managers will not provide accurate financial information
when they discharge their duty.
To begin with, the managers may decide to deliberately falsify the
data (e.g., Enron or WorldCom). Corporate managers may fall prey to
the classic “agency problems” that arise in corporations due to the
separation of ownership from control 43 and try to take advantage of corporate governance deficiencies to fraudulently appropriate for their own
private benefit a portion of the corporation’s wealth. 44 For example, a
CEO whose bonus is tied to the corporation’s reported profits may be
motivated to fraudulently inflate its profits in order to receive a higher
bonus. Better internal controls could help to prevent such fraudulent
practices by creating a clearer trail for identifying inappropriate managerial behavior. 45
41. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a), and Exchange Act §
15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2006).
42. See, e.g., Exchange Act Form 10-K, Item 8 (requiring reporting companies to
publicly disclose extensive financial information about themselves).
43. Adam Smith described the problem as follows:
The directors of [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery
frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to
consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily
give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore,
must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a
company.

ADAM SMITH, Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth, in AN INQUIRY INTO
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 264–65 (Univ. of Chi. Press
1976) (1776); see also, ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
44. See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher
Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 271 (2003);
Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 333, 339 (2006).
45. Congress first used this method of employing internal controls as a supplement
to prohibited behavior with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), Title I of Pub.
Law No. 95-213 (1977). COFFEE, supra note 40, at 144. Inspired primarily by
“concerns over foreign kickbacks and other corrupt practices taking place abroad,”
THE
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While deliberate falsification of data by companies occurs on
occasion and receives a lot of attention, it is actually the exception and
not the rule. 46 The more systemic source of inaccurate data likely arises
from managers’ inadvertent disclosure of incomplete and/or inaccurate
financial data. A company’s senior management does not inherently
have complete and accurate financial information about the issuer,
particularly as economic activities of companies grow ever more complex. In order for management to “output” accurate financial disclosure,
it needs to have in place robust systems that gather and assess the
information that feeds the eventual financial disclosure. Better information input systems (i.e., better internal controls) should lead to management having more complete and accurate information about the issuer,
which should in turn lead to better public disclosure. One can think of
this as an example of the “garbage in, garbage out” principle. 47 In order
to provide better financial disclosure output, management needs to have
in place better information input systems. Section 404 could help to
encourage such better information input systems.
2. Improve Market Efficiency and Reduce Cost of Capital
Better financial disclosure by reporting companies should lead to
more efficient securities markets and a lower cost of capital for issuers.
Information is often characterized as the “lifeblood” of securities

THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 22.2, at 803 (5th ed.
2005), Congress, among other things, amended Section 13 of the Exchange Act to
require reporting companies to “devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that . . . transactions are recorded as
necessary . . . to maintain accountability for assets.”
Exchange Act §
13(b)(2)(B)(ii)(II), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(ii). In effect, the FCPA required
companies to “record” their previously off-book accounts (i.e., slush funds) that were
used to pay bribes to foreign officials. COFFEE, supra note 40, at 144.
46. Frank Fernandez, The Roles and Responsibilities of Securities Analysts, 7 RES.
REP. 3, 6 (2001), available at http://www.sia.com/research/pdf/RsrchRprtVol2-7.PDF.
47. Garbage In, Garbage Out (abbreviated to GIGO) is a commonly used phrase in
the computer science field. Wikipedia, Garbage In, Garbage Out, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Garbage_in,_garbage_out (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). “It is used primarily to
call attention to the fact that computers, unlike humans, will unquestioningly process
the most nonsensical of input data and produce nonsensical output.” Id. The term
Garbage In, Garbage Out can also be used more liberally to describe any process where
“it is difficult to create a good result when given bad input.” Id. This Article employs
the second, more liberal usage of the term.
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markets. 48 In an ideal securities market, fully-informed buyers and
sellers negotiate at arm’s length (and at low transaction costs) to determine whether or not a particular transaction makes sense. Accurate
information about an investment facilitates proper allocation of investment capital among competing investment opportunities. On the one
hand, the seller of the investment is properly informed about the value of
the company, as well as the optimal timing and structure of the financing, so as to achieve the lowest cost of capital. On the other hand, the
buyer of the investment is properly informed about the merits of that
particular investment, as well as other available investment opportunities, so that the buyer can allocate her capital to the investments that
are likely to generate the highest returns.
A reporting company’s financial disclosure is some of the most
important information that impacts the price of its securities. Take, for
example, common stock, which represents a percentage ownership in a
corporation. Assuming a typical form of common stock, this ownership
share entitles the stockholder to a number of rights (both economic and
non-economic), 49 the most significant of which is a residual claim on the
corporation’s net assets. 50 In plain English, that residual claim means:
•

The stockholders do not have direct ownership in the corporation’s
assets, nor are they responsible for the corporation’s liabilities. The
corporation owns its own assets and is responsible for its own
liabilities.

48. John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A
Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising
Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 879 (2005) [hereinafter Orcutt, Angel Finance Market];
see also Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Quality Information: The Lifeblood of Our
Markets, Remarks at the Economic Club of New York (Oct. 18, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch304.htm.
49. Voting rights are typically the most important non-economic rights associated
with common stock. Those voting rights include the right to vote on directors, certain
business combinations, amendments to the corporation’s charter documents (e.g., its
certificate of incorporation), and dissolution of the corporation.
50. “[H]olders of common stock possess the residual claim on the corporation’s
assets . . . each share of common stock has an equal right to participate in distributions
of the firm’s earnings in the form of dividends and, in the event the corporation is
liquidated, to share equally in the firm’s assets remaining after all prior claims have
been satisfied.” STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 66
(2002).
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Instead, the stockholders have an ownership interest in what this
Article will refer to as the corporation’s “residual.” The residual is
the assets that remain upon the liquidation of the corporation after
all of the corporation’s liabilities have been satisfied. 51 In addition
to waiting for the ultimate liquidation of the corporation, stockholders may also receive a portion of the residual on a current basis
if the corporation is solvent 52 and decides to use a portion of its net
assets to pay a dividend or buy back outstanding stock.

This economic right in the corporation’s residual drives the value of
a stock. Roughly speaking, the value of a stock should be based on the
share of the corporation’s eventual residual (including future dividend
payouts and stock buybacks) represented by the stock, discounted back
to present value. 53 Assuming a healthy growing corporation, the eventual residual should be substantially greater than its current net asset
position, which means that much (if not most) of the corporation’s eventual residual will be generated in the future by the corporation generating future profits. The value of the stock is therefore fundamentally
driven by forecasts of the corporation’s future profits. 54 Competently
forecasting a corporation’s future profits and eventual residual is an inherently difficult task, as predicting the future will always entail a
substantial amount of error. 55 However, having the corporation provide
credible information about its current financial position and historical
financial track record is important for those seeking to develop intelligent forecasts and value the corporation’s stock price.
When corporations do not consistently provide credible financial
information, at least two substantial negative consequences should be
expected. First, the market will be less efficient at pricing the corpora-

51.
52.
53.

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281(a)-(b) (2008).
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a)-(b) (2008).
The present value is the current worth of a future sum of money or stream of
cash flows given a specified rate of return. Investopedia, Present Value, http://www.
investopedia.com/terms/p/presentvalue.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
54. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 173 (2003).
55. See John L. Orcutt, Investor Skepticism v. Investor Confidence: Why the New
Research Analyst Reforms Will Harm Investors, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 69 (2003)
[hereinafter Orcutt, Investor Skepticism] (analyzing the difficulties that sell-side
analysts have demonstrated in forecasting the future earnings of the companies they
cover and considering explanations for their struggles other than the conflicts of interest
that face such analysts).
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tions’ securities due to the incomplete or inaccurate information, which
will lead to inferior allocation of investment capital (e.g., too much investment capital may be dedicated to bad companies). Second, investors
should adjust to this less efficient environment by charging a higher
price for their investment capital. Rational, sophisticated investors will
discount the price they are willing to pay for securities (i.e., charge a
higher cost of capital) to compensate for the increased information risk
they face.
Therefore, if Section 404 does, in fact, improve the accuracy of
reporting companies’ financial disclosure, the price of securities traded
on the U.S. public markets should be more accurate and provide issuers
a lower cost of capital.
3. Unintended Benefits
While not the direct focus of Section 404, some unintended benefits
from the statute have been reported. The Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation 56 , an independent, nonpartisan organization composed of
representatives from business, finance, law, accounting and academia,
reported the following:
In some cases, Section 404 control reviews appear to have acted as a
catalyst for companies to improve the efficiency of financial
management. This change has led either to direct cost savings – for
example, through rationalization of the payments process – or to
improved loss avoidance, through enhanced security and safeguards.
Section 404 has also served as a catalyst for some companies to
develop Enterprise Risk Management programs, which address all
sources of risk, not just financial reporting. In the future, Section 404
programs and the control environments they have fostered will be
even more useful as companies embark on initiatives to provide
investors with real-time and more customizable financial reporting
57
information.

56. See Committee on Capital Markets Regulation Homepage, http://www.capmkts
reg.org/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). “The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation is
an independent and nonpartisan 501(c)(3) research organization dedicated to improving
the regulation of U.S. capital markets.” Id.
57. CCMR REPORT, supra note 3, at 119 (internal citations omitted).
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C. Section 404 Might not be Cost-Effective: Regulatory Response
The controversy surrounding Section 404 has not focused on the
provision’s goal for companies to have better ICFRs and more accurate
financial disclosure. Instead, the controversy centers on whether the substantial costs required to implement Section 404 exceed the statute’s
benefits, particularly for smaller reporting companies.
Congress charged the SEC with developing the rules for implementing Section 404(a) and designated the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) 58 to establish the Section 404(b) auditor
assessment standard. The initial implementing rules and procedures
were not problem-free. The SEC issued rules implementing Section
404(a) in June 2003, 59 and the PCAOB issued the corresponding auditor
standards (“Auditing Standard No. 2” or “AS 2”) in March 2004.60
Reporting companies and auditors struggled with these initial implementation rules and auditing standards, which led to the development of
Section 404 policies and procedures that proved to be “burdensome and
time-consuming in practice.” 61
The SEC and PCAOB have tried to respond to these implementation concerns. First, the SEC implemented Section 404 slowly to
allow for a learning curve to develop on how best to conduct the Section
404 process. As difficulties in implementation became apparent, the
SEC postponed compliance deadlines on more than one occasion, in particular for smaller companies, in order to give issuers and auditors time
to adapt to Section 404. The following table sets forth the various
deadlines and postponements:
58. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) Home Page,
http://www.pcaobus.org/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). The PCAOB is the independent
board created by SOX to oversee the auditors of reporting companies. SOX § 101(a)
and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) and (b) (2002).
59. SEC Release 33-8238, supra note 5.
60. PCAOB, AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2 (Mar. 9, 2002), http://www.pcaobus.
org/Rules/Rules_of_the_Board/Auditing_Standard_2.pdf. The SEC approved Auditing
Standard No. 2 on June 17, 2004. Order Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 2,
Release No. 34-49884 (June 17, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/3449884.htm.
61. WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP, SEC DEFINES “MATERIAL WEAKNESS” AND
GIVES GUIDANCE ON EVALUATION OF INTERNAL CONTROLS, Aug. 28, 2007, at 2,
http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl_s29Publications%5CFileUpload5686%5C2486%5CS
EC_Defines_Material_Weakness_and_Gives_Guidance.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2009)
[hereinafter WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER PUBLICATION].
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Status of Issuer
Large accelerated
filers 62

Accelerated
filers: 65

Non-accelerated
filers (including
foreign private
issuers 68 ): 69
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Section 404 Compliance Deadline
Initially required to include management report on ICFR
and auditor attestation in their annual reports for fiscal
years ending on or after June 15, 2004. 63 The SEC granted
an extension in Feb. 2004 that delayed the initial
compliance deadline to the fiscal year ending on or after
Nov. 15, 2004. 64
Initially subject to the same deadlines as large accelerated
filers. 66 For accelerated filers with fiscal years ending
between and including Nov. 15, 2004 and Feb. 28, 2005,
the SEC granted them up to an additional 45 days to
include management report on ICFR and auditor attestation
in their annual reports. 67
Initially required to include management report on ICFR
and auditor attestation in their annual reports for fiscal
years ending on or after April 15, 2005. 70 The SEC
granted several extensions (the last of which was in Feb.
2008) that delayed the initial compliance deadlines as
follows:
• Not required to include a management report on ICFR
until it files an annual report for the fiscal year ending on
or after Dec. 15, 2007. 71
• Not required to include an auditor attestation until it files
an annual report for the fiscal year ending on or after
Dec. 15, 2009. 72

62. Public company with a worldwide public equity float (excluding affiliates)
of $700 million or more and has filed at least one annual report with the SEC.

Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, supra note 24.
63. SEC Release 33-8238, supra note 5.
64. Final Rule: Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Release
Nos. 33-8392; 34-49313; IC-26357 (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/33-8392.htm [hereinafter SEC Release 33-8392]; 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 228-29,
240, 249, 270, 274 (2008).
65. Public company with a worldwide public equity float (excluding affiliates)

of $75 million or more, but less than $700 million, and has filed at least one annual
report with the SEC. Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, supra note 24.
66. At the time of the original SEC releases implementing Section 404 (e.g., SEC
Releases 33-8238 and 33-8392), the term “large accelerated filers” did not exist. At
that time, the category was simply “accelerated filers” and included both “large
accelerated filers” and “accelerated filers.” The SEC did not split the accelerated filer
definition into two separate categories until December 21, 2005. Final Rule: Revisions
to Accelerated Filer Definition and Accelerated Deadlines for Filing Periodic Reports,
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In June 2007, the SEC amended the rules relating to management’s
evaluation of ICFR 73 and issued interpretative guidance for management’s use in its evaluation. 74 These changes were meant to make manRelease Nos. 33-8644, 34-52989 (Dec. 21, 2005), 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 229, 240, 249,
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8644.pdf [hereinafter SEC Release 338644].
67. Order under Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Granting an
Exemption from Specified Provisions of Exchange Act Rules 13a-1 and 15d-1, Release
No. 34-50754 (Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders/3450754.htm.
68. Exchange Act Rule 3b-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (2008), defines the term
“foreign private issuer” as:
[A]ny foreign issuer other than a foreign government except for an issuer meeting the
following conditions . . . :
• More than 50 percent of the issuer’s outstanding voting securities are directly
or indirectly held of record by residents of the United States; and
• Any of the following:
 The majority of the executive officers or directors are United States
citizens or residents;
 More than 50 percent of the assets of the issuer are located in the United
States; or
 The business of the issuer is administered principally in the United States.
Like with non-accelerated filers, the SEC has deemed that foreign private issuers
require special attention and has granted these issuers significant extensions for
complying with Section 404. This Article does not address the special case of foreign
private issuers and instead focuses entirely on the special case of smaller companies
generally.
69. Public company with a worldwide public equity float (excluding affiliates)

of less than $75 million, or one that has yet to file an annual report with the SEC.
The term “non-accelerated filer” is not defined in the Exchange Act. Instead, the term
“non-accelerated filer” captures issuers that are not “large accelerated filers” or
“accelerated filers” as defined in Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, supra note 24.
70. SEC Release 33-8238, supra note 5.
71. Final Rule: Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act
Periodic Reports of Non-Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies, Release Nos.
33-8760; 34-54942 (Dec. 15, 2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 228, 229, 240, 249 (2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8760.pdf.
72. SEC Release 2008-16, supra note 26.
73. Final Rule: Amendments to Rules Regarding Management’s Report on Internal
Control Over Financial Reporting, Release Nos. 33-8809; 34-55928 (June 20, 2007), 17
C.F.R. §§ 210, 228, 229, 240, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/338809.pdf.
74. Interpretive Release: Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Report
on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release Nos. 33-8810; 34-55929 (June 20, 2007), 17
C.F.R. § 241, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2007/33-8810.pdf [herein-
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agement’s evaluation of ICFR more effective and more efficient by
endorsing a “top-down, risk-based evaluation” that focuses on preventing material misstatements in financial statements. 75 In May 2007, the
PCAOB adopted Auditing Standard No. 5 (“AS 5”) 76 to replace the previously used AS 2, 77 and the SEC later approved AS 5 in July 2007.78
Among other things, these actions 79 created a safe harbor for management evaluations that comply with the SEC’s interpretative guidance 80
and brought management’s evaluation of ICFR more into alignment
with the auditor’s responsibilities under AS 5. 81 These changes were

after SEC Interpretive Release 33-8810].
75. Id. at 1, 4.
76. PCAOB, Auditing Standard No. 5 – An Audit of Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting that is Integrated with an Audit of Financial Statements, available
at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules_of_the_Board/Auditing_Standard_5.pdf. AS 5
applies to audits for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2007. PCAOB,
Board Approves New Audit Standard for Internal Control over Financial Reporting
and, Separately, Recommendations on Inspection Frequency Rule, May 24, 2007,
available at http://www.pcaobus.org/News_and_Events/News/2007/05-24.aspx.
77. Id.
78. Order Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 5, An Audit of Internal
Control Over Financial Reporting that is Integrated with an Audit of Financial
Statements, a Related Independence Rule, and Conforming Amendments, Release No.
34-56152 (July 27, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/2007/34-561
52.pdf [hereinafter SEC Release 34-56152].
79. In a related rule release, the SEC adopted a definition for the term “significant
deficiency” for purpose of the SEC rules implementing Section 404 and 302. Final
Rule: Definition of the Term Significant Deficiency, Release Nos. 33-8829 and 3456203 (Aug. 3, 2007), 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 240, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/2007/33-8829.pdf [hereinafter SEC Release 33-8829].
80. SEC Interpretive Release 33-8810, supra note 74, at 1.
81. Press Release: SEC Approves New Guidance for Compliance with Section 404
of Sarbanes-Oxley (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2007/2007-101.htm [hereinafter SEC May 2007 Press Release]. For practical
summaries of the mid-June 2007 changes by the SEC and the PCAOB to Section 404
compliance, see WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER PUBLICATION, supra note 61; PAUL,
WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, SEC ADOPTS FINAL RULES AND
PUBLISHES INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE FOR MANAGEMENT REGARDING ITS EVALUATION
OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING, July 13, 2007, at 2,
http://www.paulweiss.com/files/Publication/205da5f8-e527-48d7-8c89-269a30fab5ee/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/30b4db2e-f850-4887-aeaa-2cc4d4921550/13-Jul07SECMemo.pdf; JONES DAY, SEC ADOPTS SECTION 404 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE AND
RULE AMENDMENTS; NEW PCAOB AUDITING STANDARD, July 2007, http://www.
jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S4459.
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meant to create a more flexible environment where management and the
auditors can scale their Section 404 efforts according to the particular
facts and circumstances of the company. 82 For smaller, less complex
reporting companies, the changes were meant to allow management and
the auditors to tailor their efforts to reflect the company’s lower level of
complexity. 83
In practice, even before the recent SEC and PCAOB changes –
which should help to reduce compliance costs – Section 404 compliance
costs appeared to be declining. 84 Nevertheless, there remains a significant risk that Section 404 compliance costs currently exceed the statute’s
benefits and that Section 404 may continue to be a cost-ineffective
statute.
PART II: DO SMALLER COMPANIES REQUIRE SPECIAL ATTENTION?
In the face of this potentially cost-ineffective statute, is there something about smaller companies that warrants their receiving significant
relief from Section 404? The answer to this question turns out to be
“maybe.” Before analyzing the special case of smaller companies, it is
necessary to point out that there is no precise definition for what constitutes a “smaller company.” One of the most commonly employed techniques for classifying companies by size is to consider their equity
market capitalization. This is the approach, for example, that the SEC
has taken with respect to Section 404. Roughly speaking, reporting
companies with market capitalizations of $700 million or more are
“larger” reporting companies, 85 while those with market capitalizations
of less than $75 million are the “smallest” reporting companies. 86 For
those reporting companies that fall in the middle range (i.e., market
capitalization between $75 million and $700 million), many – if not all
of them – could be considered “smaller” reporting companies, and are
frequently referred to as “smallcap” companies. 87 Since this Article
82. SEC May 2007 Press Release, supra note 81; see also SEC Release 34-56152,
supra note 78, at 4.
83. SEC May 2007 Press Release, supra note 81; see also SEC Release 34-56152,
supra note 78, at 4.
84. See discussion infra Part III.B.
85. Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, supra note 24 (defining “large accelerated filers”).
86. These companies would not qualify as “accelerated filers” as defined in
Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, supra note 24.
87. See, e.g., Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public
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concludes that smaller reporting companies should not be granted
special regulatory relief, it will not be exploring the precise boundaries
of the classification.
A. Cost-Ineffective Regulations Tend to Disproportionately
Harm Smaller Companies
As a general rule, complying with legal mandates is disproportionately more expensive for smaller companies (e.g., as a percentage of
revenues or profits) than for larger companies. 88 This increased regulatory burden for smaller companies appears to stem from the tendency
of regulatory compliance to involve a significant amount of fixed costs,
irrespective of the size of a company. 89 For example, a firm must
develop an expertise in the particular regulation or requirement, and
establish internal procedures, and assign personnel, to handle the
regulatory or compliance function. Many of these information-gathering
and personnel costs are not dependent upon firm size. Thus smaller
firms with lesser revenues are forced to bear these fixed costs over a
smaller revenue base, which disproportionately lowers their profitability. 90 The same principle applies to auditing activities. Smaller
companies have also historically paid disproportionately higher audit
fees (as a percentage of revenues) than larger companies. Because
Section 404 involves both an increased regulatory and auditing burden,
Companies to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 15 and 16 (2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf.
88. EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, ON THE ROAD TO AN
ENTREPRENEURIAL ECONOMY: A RESEARCH AND POLICY GUIDE 28 (July 2007),
available at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/entrepreneurial_roadmap_2.pdf.
But see W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS (Sept.
2005), available at http://heartland.temp.siteexecutive.com/pdf/21117.pdf (report
delivered under a contact with the Office of Advocacy, the United States Small
Business Administration). Crain’s study indicates that the most extreme disproportionate impact occurs with small companies that have less than 20 employees. Id. at
54-55. Section 404, however, is unlikely to apply to such extremely small companies.
When Crain compared companies with between 21 and 499 employees (“medium-sized
companies”) to companies with 500 or more employees (“large companies”), the
disproportionate impact of regulatory costs shrinks substantially. Id.
89. See Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., The
Changing Burden of Regulation, Paperwork, and Tax Compliance on Small Business –
A Report to Congress (Oct. 1995), available at http://www.sba.gov/ADVO/laws/
archive/law_brd.html [hereinafter OCCA Report].
90. See id.
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it poses a double threat of disproportionate treatment for smaller
companies.
A 2006 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (the
“GAO”) to the U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship (the “GAO Report”) 91 provides evidence of the disproportionately higher audit fees that smaller companies face and of Section 404’s
aggravation of the situation. The GAO Report, which analyzed the impact of SOX on smaller public companies (including costs of compliance and access to capital), 92 found that “resource limitations make it
more difficult for smaller public companies to achieve economies of
scale, segregate duties and responsibilities, and hire qualified accounting
personnel to prepare and report financial information.” 93 The GAO
Report examined public issuers’ audit fees in 2003 and 2004 (the first
year that internal control reports were required) and found:
•

•

“[s]maller companies historically have paid disproportionately
higher audit fees than larger companies as a percent of revenues;” 94 and
“the percentage difference between median audit fees paid by
small versus large public companies grew in 2004, particularly
for companies that implemented [SOX’s] internal control provisions (section 404).” 95

The following table provides the summary statistics from the
GAO’s examination of audit fee costs: 96

91. U. S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON SMALL
BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, U.S. SENATE: SARBANES-OXLEY ACT –
CONSIDERATION OF KEY PRINCIPLES NEEDED IN ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION FOR
SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d06361.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 18.
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 16. Professors Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley produced a similar
table in their article on SOX’s effect on small firms. Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 14.
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Median audit fee
(% of 2004 revenues) 98

97

No.

%

Companies

Companies

that filed

that did not

ICFR

file ICFR

Reports

99

Reports

$0 - $75
>$75 - $250

0.64%
0.29%

66 of 2,263
520 of 1,188

3%
44%

1.14%
0.56%

0.79%
0.35%

>$250 - $500

0.18%

376 of 641

59%

0.40%

0.26%

>$500 - $700
>$700 $1,000

0.15%
0.13%

184 of 309
183 of 283

60%
65%

0.30%
0.25%

0.20%
0.12%

>$1,000

0.07%

927 of 1,342

69%

0.13%

0.07%

While cost-ineffective regulations harm all companies, smaller
companies are particularly vulnerable. Due to greater resource constraints, smaller companies already face numerous and substantial disadvantages when trying to compete against larger companies. 100 If Section
97.
98.
99.

Based on publicly-reported audit fees. GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 15.
Based on publicly-reported audit fees. Id. at 15.
While the GAO REPORT provides an approximation of the impact of Section
404 on audit fees, the methodology of the GAO REPORT did not allow it to specifically
isolate the audit fees associated with Section 404. Id. at 15.
100. More than a half century ago, economist Joseph A. Schumpeter explained how
the need for smaller companies to overcome their competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis
larger, more well-established competitors helps to revolutionize economies from within.
This process, which Schumpeter referred to as “Creative Destruction,” describes how
new, smaller competitors must seek innovations to render their competitors obsolete.
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950).
Entrepreneurs create new products, markets, processes for doing business, and even
new industries, while old inefficient ones are destroyed. These newly created ventures
must be more innovative and productive than their already established competitors in
order to compete, which has the added benefit of forcing the established competitors to
improve. Established competitors, as well as entire industries, that cannot meet the
increased competition and innovations are forced out of business, which causes a
constant renewal of the economy. Id.
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404 is in fact cost-ineffective, the greater resource constraints that tend
to hamper smaller companies – coupled with the disproportionately negative impact of cost-ineffective regulations and auditing standards –
make it even more difficult for them to compete by retarding their
growth (i.e., making them less profitable) and further exacerbating their
resource disadvantages vis-à-vis their larger, more well-established
competitors. Such an outcome should be expected to render the environment for forming and developing smaller companies less attractive.
B. Small Companies are not a Homogenous Group
Proposals calling for Section 404 relief for smaller reporting companies are frequently motivated, at least in part, by this potential threat
to smaller companies and the perceived critical role that smaller companies play in the U.S. economy. For example, in his testimony before the
House Small Business Committee on June 5, 2007 regarding the impact
of Section 404 on small companies, David T. Hirschmann, Senior Vice
President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce and President, U.S. Chamber
Center for Capital Markets, made the following statement as a
justification for delaying the implementation of Section 404 for nonaccelerated filers: 101
Small business drives much of the economic activity, innovation,
and job creation in the United States. Over the last decade, for
example, small businesses have generated 60 to 80 percent of net
new jobs. These businesses made up 97 percent of exporters and
produced 28 percent of the known export value in FY 2005. Small
businesses employ 41 percent of high-tech workers and produce 13
to 14 times more patents per employee than large patenting
102
businesses.

101. David T. Hirschmann, Senior Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
President, U.S. Chamber Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, Testimony
before the House Small Business Committee, Getting Small Business Right: SarbanesOxley Section 404 and Small Business (June 5, 2007), available at http://www.house.
gov/smbiz/hearings/hearing-06-5-07-sox/testimony-06-05-07-USCC.pdf.
102. Id. at 3 (citing U.S. Small Business Administration, Frequently Asked
Questions – Advocacy Small Business Statistics and Research, http://web.sba.gov/faqs/
faqIndexAll.cfm?areaid=24 (last visited Jan. 14, 2009)).
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Despite the frequency of such small businesses accolades, 103 these
general statements about the benefits of small businesses are misleading
and can distort the analysis of policy initiatives aimed at assisting U.S.
economic growth and job creation. 104 General statements of this sort are
misleading because it is simply and unambiguously inaccurate to view
small companies as a homogenous group. 105 In reality, the term small
company encompasses a wide range of different types of companies, not
all of which serve such economically and socially beneficial roles. For
example, the Small Business Association provides statistics for “small
businesses”, which are generally defined as those business having less
than 500 employees. 106 SOX has almost no impact on the vast majority
103. See, e.g., U.S. Small Business Administration, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2009) (providing various
statistics about smaller businesses). Even the Chairman of the SEC is prone to such
general statements about small businesses. In his opening remarks for the 2006 SEC
Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation, SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox made the following statement:
Since the beginning of our country, small businesses have been the backbone of the
American economy. It’s a continuing marvel that even today, in the 21st century – in
the midst of globalization and globe straddling technology, small business creates
more jobs than anyone else . . . . Small businesses pump billions in the economy.
They are, in many ways, what makes America great.

25TH ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL
FORMATION, FINAL REPORT, 10 (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus
/gbfor25.pdf.
104. Daniel Sandler, Tax Incentives and Angel Capital: Federal & State Incentive
Review and Commentary, VC EXPERTS, Nov. 2, 2004, available at http://vcexperts.com
/vce/news/buzz/archive_view.asp?id=245 (on file with author).
105. Robert Heilbroner and Lester Thurow discussed this misconception as follows:
In the last two decades the assertion has often been made that most of the jobs in
America are being created by small businesses and that, as a result, such business
should be seen as the engines of national economic success. By implication, nothing
else is necessary or important. Such assertions are neither factually correct nor
economically true. What creates jobs are not small businesses as such, but small
businesses that grow large (Wal-Mart, Hewlett Packard, Microsoft).

ROBERT HEILBRONER & LESTER THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED: EVERYTHING YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT HOW THE ECONOMY WORKS AND WHERE IT’S GOING 171 (rev.
ed., Simon & Schuster 1998).
106. U.S. Small Business Administration, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note
103.
The Office of Advocacy [of the U.S. Small Business Administration] defines a small
business for research purposes as an independent business having fewer than 500
employees. Firms wishing to be designated small businesses for government programs
such as contracting must meet size standards specified by the U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA) Office of Size Standards. These standards vary by industry [.]
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of “small businesses,” as SOX only applies to reporting companies and
the vast majority of small businesses are private companies with no
desire (or no realistic hope) of ever being a reporting company. More
than 90% of small businesses consist of what are commonly referred to
as “livelihood businesses” 107 (also referred to as “Mom and Pop businesses”), whose object is:
[T]o provide an income for the organizers and perhaps members of
their families . . . . There is no “exit strategy,” no expectation of a
dynamic multiple of earnings being paid for the business five years
down the road, no equity investors other than the founder . . . no
108
sources of cash capital other than the local bank.

For example, owner-operated convenience stores, suburban construction companies, or hair salons typically fall under the livelihood
business classification. As a result, discussions of the potential impact
of Section 404 on “small businesses” generally overstate the statute’s
reach. In practice, the “small companies” that are impacted by Section
404 constitute a very different profile of companies than the traditional
small business designation. The group impacted by Section 404 is
limited to smaller reporting companies and to private companies for
which becoming a reporting company is a reasonable possibility in the
foreseeable future (e.g., companies that reasonably forecast conducting
an IPO in the foreseeable future). To provide some structure to this
concept, and to highlight the heterogeneity of smaller companies and
their particular issues, this Article will distinguish between three types
of small companies that are impacted by Section 404:
Rapid-Growth Start-ups: These private companies are created with
the intention to rapidly grow and become dominant firms. Rapid-Growth
Start-ups are well-represented in the high technology sector (e.g., the
private technology firms that dominate Silicon Valley) and are frequently the target of venture capital investments. 109 While representing only a
very small percentage of private small businesses, it is Rapid-Growth

Id.
107. DANIEL SANDLER, VENTURE CAPITAL AND TAX INCENTIVES: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 2 (2004) .
108. JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS,
RESTRUCTURINGS AND REORGANIZATIONS 7 (2d ed. 1995).
109. Orcutt, Angel Finance Market, supra note 48, at 865.
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Start-ups, and not livelihood businesses, that have demonstrated a capacity to create a disproportionate amount of the innovations, 110 macroeconomic growth, 111 and net new jobs 112 in the United States. 113
Growth Smaller Reporting Companies (“Growth SRCs”): These
smaller reporting companies have a realistic possibility of growing and
becoming large companies. This category is dominated by (i) former
rapid-growth start-ups that have conducted IPOs, and (ii) former large
reporting companies that have struggled (and as a result, have become
smaller companies), but that have retained the ability to correct their
problems and grow back into larger companies. One common factor
among Growth SRCs is that such companies receive a significant level
110. One technique that has been used to measure the innovation advantage from
rapid-growth start-ups is to examine the patents that come out of companies that have
received financing from VC funds. See Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the
Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 674-75, 689-91
(2000) (finding that VC-backed companies produced more patents than non-VC-backed
companies and the patents the VC-backed firms produced were apparently more
valuable).
111. See MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL INVESTING:
MATCHING START-UP FUNDS WITH START-UP COMPANIES – THE GUIDE FOR
ENTREPRENEURS, INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS 22 (2000).
112. See Jeffrey E. Sohl, The Early-Stage Equity Market in the USA, 1 VENTURE
CAPITAL 101, 105 (1999). (“Over the last 4 years [from 1996 to 1999], these high
growth start-ups added 6 million jobs to an economy that added 7.7 million jobs in total.
For entrepreneurs, size is a transient characteristic where firms start small (and as such
receive the small business label) but grow fast.”). Id; see also DAVID BIRCH ET AL.,
WHO’S CREATING JOBS? 6-7 (1994).
Most of the new jobs attributable to small firms are thus created by a relatively few
small firms that start small and grow fast. Said another way, most small firms grow
slowly. It is not the local drug store or beauty shop or restaurant that is the main
engine of job growth – it is the Gazelle [Birch’s nickname for “mostly smaller firms
that start with the intent to grow, and pull it off”].

Id. Gazelles (which accounted for no more than 3% of firms) added 4.4 million jobs to
the economy between 1989 and 1993, a period when the economy hardly grew. Id. at 6.
113. Furthermore, rapid growth start-ups cull less productive companies and
industries, a benefit that allows those resources to be redeployed in a higher value-add
manner. One study examined the impact of small firms generally on the competition
level of industries in which they operate. Joan E. Mitchell, Small Firms: A Critique,
THREE BANKS REV. 50 (1980). The essay argues that “small firms have a special role in
increasing competition” with large firms within an industry, and they can increase the
competitive level of the industry as a whole. One reason is that small firms may be less
inclined to adopt collusive and restrictive practices, which can reduce the competitive
level of the industry. Id. at 54-55.
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of institutional and secondary market support for their securities,
frequently referred to by academics as support from “securities market
intermediaries” or “financial intermediaries”. 114 Namely, these companies have meaningful coverage from research analysts 115 and a significant portion of their outside shareholders are large, institutional investtors (e.g., mutual funds or hedge funds). 116 These companies may also
receive additional secondary support through coverage by the financial
press and support from investment banks.
Orphan Smaller Reporting Companies (“Orphan SRCs”): These
smaller reporting companies have little to no meaningful institutional
support. Orphan SRCs are unlikely to have any meaningful research
coverage, 117 and they are also unlikely to have meaningful ownership
from large, institutional shareholders. This category is dominated by (i)
firms that trade on the Pink Sheets or the OTC Bulletin Board, 118 (ii)
former rapid-growth start-ups that have conducted IPOs, but have since
proved to be unsuccessful, (iii) former large companies that have strug114. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of Securities
Market Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45 (2004); Orcutt, Angel Finance
Market, supra note 48.
115. Research analysts (aka securities analysts) conduct research on particular
securities and provide research reports to investors in order to assist their investment
decisions regarding such securities. Orcutt, Investor Skepticism, supra note 55, 6-10.
116. For a discussion of the importance of institutional support for smaller companies, see 26TH ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS
CAPITAL FORMATION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, 109-111 (2006), available at http://
www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/2007gbforumproceedings.pdf.
117. COFFEE, supra note 40, at 270 (citing statistics provided by Thomson/First
Call). (“[O]f the roughly 14,000 publicly-traded companies in the U.S. [including both
large and smaller companies], fewer than 6,000 are today covered by even a single
analyst (and less than half of these 6,000 are covered by two or more analysts).”). Id.
118. Pink Sheets – Electronic OTC Markets, Defining the OTC Market and the Pink
Sheets, http://www.pinksheets.com/pink/otcguide/investors_index.jsp (last visited Jan.
24, 2009).
The OTC, or ‘Over-the-Counter,’ market is not an organized marketplace or
exchange. OTC is a catchall phrase for any market in an equity security that is not
listed on a US exchange or on the Nasdaq Stock Market. OTC securities are issued by
companies that either choose not to list, or are unable to meet the standards for listing,
on NASDAQ or a US stock exchange. OTC equity securities can be quoted on the
Pink Sheets Electronic Quotation Service, and/or, if the securities are registered with
the SEC and their issuers are current in their reporting obligation, on the OTC Bulletin
Board.

Id.
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gled so badly that they are unlikely to recover, and (iv) companies that
have gone public through reverse mergers with public shells. 119
Rather than idealized growth companies, it is Orphan SRCs that
dominate the smaller companies impacted by Section 404.120 So, while
small company advocates may wish to improve the operating environment for Rapid-Growth Start-ups and Growth SRCs by reducing the
impact of Section 404, they must also account for the impact that such
regulatory reduction would have on Orphan SRCs and their security
holders.

119. Reverse mergers into public shells are sometimes used as a technique by
companies to “go public” without conducting an IPO. Professor Sjostrom offers the
following explanation:
A private operating company merges into a non-operating or shell public company. In
the merger, the operating company shareholders are issued shares of the shell in
exchange for the operating company shares. Post-merger, the former operating
company shareholders own 80-90% of the shell (which now contains the assets and
liabilities of the operating company) with the remaining 10-20% owned by the
existing shell company shareholders (i.e., the shell’s promoter and its affiliates). The
shell company’s name is then changed to the name of the operating company, and the
company’s shares are listed for trading on the Pink Sheets or, if it has at least 200
shareholders, the OTC Bulletin Board. Where do these public shells come from?
There are many promoters of public shells out there. Do a Google search of “public
shell” and you’ll see what I’m talking about. These promoters typically incubate their
own shells—they incorporate a company, voluntarily register its shares under the
1934 Act, and then timely file with the SEC the required quarterly and annual reports.
Because the shell has no operations, it’s fairly simple and inexpensive to make these
filings. In exchange for letting an operating company merge into a shell, the promoter
charges the operating company a fee and retains the 10-20% interest in the shell postmerger. They pitch the shell as quicker, easier and cheaper way to go public than
through a conventional IPO . . . The company is now public in the sense that its shares
are registered with the SEC and quoted on the Pink Sheets or OTC Bulletin Board, but
it has not received the two primary benefits of going public: additional equity capital
and share liquidity. Merging with a shell does not raise any capital. As for liquidity,
no underwriter is helping to develop active trading in the company’s stock, so while
the shares are technically publicly traded, the market is illiquid. Nonetheless, the
company now faces the many disadvantages of being public including increased
expenses, increased liability exposure, and loss of confidentiality.

Going Public Through a Public Shell Reverse Merger, Posting of Bill Sjostrom to
Business Law Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2005/10/going
_public_th.html (Oct. 30, 2005).
120. Based on the Thomson/First Call statistics cited in COFFEE, supra note 40, at
270, more than 8,000 of the 14,000 publicly-traded companies in the United States have
no analyst coverage.
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C. Do Smaller Companies have a Greater Need for Section 404?
As the picture of the smaller companies impacted by Section 404
becomes clearer – including the fact that the category is dominated by
Orphan SRCs – the question that follows is whether smaller reporting
companies have a greater need than larger companies for the services
provided by Section 404. 121 While Section 404 appears to be disproportionately more expensive for smaller reporting companies, is it also
disproportionately more beneficial?
1. The Case for Section 404 being Less
Beneficial for Smaller Companies
Rational arguments can be made that Section 404 is less beneficial
for smaller reporting companies than for larger reporting companies.
For example, smaller reporting companies are more likely to have
simpler financial operations, 122 which could make it easier for their
management to have relatively complete and accurate financial data
without the need for elaborate internal controls. Additionally, internal
control structures may be less useful for smaller companies since they
tend to rely more heavily on top managers for control, who are likely
able to override the controls irrespective of Section 404. 123
2. The Case for Section 404 being More
Beneficial for Smaller Companies
There are equally rational arguments, however, that smaller
companies may have a greater need for the services provided by Section
404. To begin with, smaller firms have been more likely than large
companies to find weaknesses in their internal controls. 124 Weaker
121. See, e.g., Kamar et al., supra note 10. In their study on SOX’s effect on small
firms, Professors Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley considered whether small firms
have greater need for the services provided by Section 404. Id. at 9-11, 27.
122. See, e.g., SEC May 2007 Press Release, supra note 81.
123. See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 53-54.
124. Jeffrey Doyle, Weili Ge & Sarah McVay, Determinants of Weaknesses in
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, 44 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 193, 195 (2007).
Doyle, Ge & McVay looked at firms disclosing material weaknesses in their internal
controls under Sections 404 and 302 from August 2002 to August 2005. Id. Their
study found that material weaknesses in internal controls “are more likely for firms that
are smaller, less profitable, more complex, growing rapidly, or undergoing restruc-
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internal controls increase the potential both for financial fraud and for
inadvertent financial disclosure inaccuracies. Not surprisingly, researchers have found that smaller reporting companies tend to have a higher
incidence of accounting restatements than larger firms. 125 A 2007 study
on restatement trends by Glass Lewis & Co. found that restatements by
companies with market capitalizations of less than $75 million constituted 50% of financial restatements by reporting companies in 2005 and
62% in 2006. 126
On a related note, smaller reporting companies – particularly
Orphan SRCs – are less likely to have strong institutional and secondary
market support than larger companies. 127 This is relevant because such
institutional and secondary market support is critical to the efficient
functioning of the market for a particular security. All securities investments pose information problems to investors (e.g., investors do not
have complete and accurate information), as well as agency problems
(e.g., managers may try to take advantage of their controlling role in the
corporation to misappropriate a portion of the corporation’s wealth for
their own private benefit). 128 Overcoming these problems requires costly
information-gathering efforts and monitoring of management. 129 For
reporting companies, however, the presence of diverse shareholders
complicates these information-gathering and monitoring efforts, and
leads to a collective action problem. 130 Namely, while the benefit to the
security holders as a whole may justify the cost of gathering and
assessing information or monitoring management, such cost is greater
than the benefit that would be received by any one security holder or
turing.” Id. at 220; Stephen Bryan & Steven Lilien, Characteristics of Firms with
Material Weaknesses in Internal Control: An Assessment of Section 404 of Sarbanes
Oxley (March 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=682363. “Based upon early
evidence of firms with material weaknesses, as defined by the Public Accounting
Oversight Board, we find that firms with material weaknesses are, on average, both
smaller and worse performers than their matched industry counterparts.” Id. at 23.
125. MARK GROTHE, GLASS LEWIS & CO., THE ERRORS OF THEIR WAYS 8 (Feb. 27,
2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/nbr/pdf/GlassLewis-Errors.pdf.
126. Id.
127. See discussion supra Part II.B.
128. Choi & Fisch, supra note 44, at 271; see also, Cross & Prentice, supra note 44,
at 339.
129. Choi & Fisch, supra note 44, at 271; see also, Cross & Prentice, supra note 44,
at 339.
130. Choi & Fisch, supra note 44, at 271; see also, Cross & Prentice, supra note 44,
at 339.
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potential security holder. 131 Without a mechanism to spread the costs
across the security holders (or potential security holders) collectively,
one should expect a suboptimal level of such activities.
A common market response to these information, agency and
collective action problems is the presence of institutional and secondary
support, which helps to provide the information-gathering and monitoring services on behalf of collective groups of security holders. As a
result, companies with more institutional and secondary support should
generally be expected to have more efficient pricing of their securities,
since they will have a greater level of information-gathering and monitoring services provided to their security holders.
Smaller reporting companies, therefore, face a double problem:
•
•

They are more prone to inaccurate financial disclosure; and
They receive less collective information-gathering and monitoring services to cope with this increased level of inaccuracy,
due to their reduced institutional and secondary support.

As a result, smaller companies may actually have a greater need
than larger companies for Section 404’s collective mechanism for providing the information gathering and monitoring services that are not
being adequately provided by the market. 132
PART III: SECTION 404 COMPLIANCE COSTS ARE SUBSTANTIAL
While doubt may exist about the overall net effect of Section 404
on smaller companies, there is no doubt that compliance with Section
404 has turned out to be very expensive.

131. Choi & Fisch, supra note 44, at 271. For example, a single shareholder who
expends resources individually to monitor management may improve the corporation’s
management and benefit all of the shareholders of the corporation collectively.
However, the single shareholder will likely have to bear this cost on its own. Id. at 278.
Therefore, while the collective group of shareholders may benefit from this increased
monitoring, including those that did not bear the cost, such monitoring will not likely
take place unless the benefit is so great that it is justified by the individual benefit to the
single shareholder. Id.
132. See Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 9-11, 27.

358

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIV

A. Isolating Impact of Section 404 is Difficult
Before examining the available evidence about the costs and
benefits of Section 404, it is necessary to point out that isolating the
specific impact of Section 404 is an extremely challenging, if not
impossible, pursuit. 133 To begin with, Section 404 has not been implemented in a vacuum, but rather is only one part of SOX’s complex and
far-reaching set of regulatory reforms. As companies have adjusted to
Section 404, they have also been adjusting to a multitude of other
regulations – many of which are closely related to Section 404, such as
SOX Section 302’s requirement that CEOs and CFOs individually
certify their companies’ annual and quarterly Exchange Act reports, 134 a
new audit committee requirement, 135 multiple provisions related to management compensation, 136 and a prohibition on auditing firms from providing certain non-audit services to their auditing clients. 137 When
trying to determine the costs associated with implementing Section 404,
it is not always clear that researchers have been able to segregate the
effects of Section 404 from these related regulations, which could falsely inflate the costs associated with Section 404. 138 At the same time,
these other various reforms are aimed at reducing the same information
and agency problems that Section 404 aims to treat, which makes it
difficult to identify with precision whether benefits attributed to Section
404 stem solely from Section 404, or partially from Section 404 and
partially from one of the related measures. 139
Regarding smaller companies, there is the further issue that Section
133.
134.
135.

See id. at 2-3.
SOX § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
SOX § 302 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (amending Section 10A of the Exchange

Act).
136. For example, Section 306 of SOX prohibits directors and executive officers
from trading in their firms’ equity securities during pension fund blackout periods, 15
U.S.C. § 7244. Section 402(a) of SOX amends Section 13 of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78m to prohibit most personal loans by issuers to their directors and executive
officers. Section 403 of SOX amends Section 16 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p
to require directors, officers and beneficial owners of more than 10% of the issuer’s
stock to report their trades in the issuer’s securities within two business days of the
trade.
137. SOX § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g), (h) (amending Section 10A of the Exchange
Act).
138. See generally Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 2-3.
139. See generally id.
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404 has yet to be fully implemented for the smallest public companies
(i.e., non-accelerated filers). As a result, there is little direct evidence on
the specific impact that Section 404 will have on that class of issuers.
B. Direct Compliance Costs
Complying with Section 404 involves a number of direct costs for
issuers that can be grouped into three primary categories:140
Internal costs: The internal people hours that an issuer is required to
dedicate for complying with Section 404. 141
External costs (excluding audit attestation fees): The external
people hours (e.g., external consultants) and expenses (e.g., purchases of
improved information technology systems) incurred by the issuer for
Section 404 compliance, excluding people hours and expenses from the
issuer’s primary auditor. 142
Auditor attestation fees: The amount the issuer pays to receive the
Auditor’s Internal Control Report.
These direct compliance costs are substantial. In fact, they have
proven to be much greater than the SEC’s original forecast of annual
internal and external costs (excluding auditor attestation fees) of $91,000
per company. 143 For example, Financial Executives International (FEI)
annually surveys FEI-member executives from public issuers to determine their direct Section 404 compliance costs. 144 These surveys gener140. These are three categories employed by Financial Executives International in
its annual survey on the costs associated with implementing Section 404. FIN.
EXECUTIVES INT’L & FIN. EXECUTIVES RESEARCH FOUND., FEI AUDIT FEE SURVEY:
INCLUDING SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 COSTS, 12, 13, 15 (Apr. 2008) [hereinafter
FEI 2008 Survey]; FIN. EXECUTIVES INT’L & FIN. EXECUTIVES RESEARCH FOUND., FEI
SURVEY ON SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 IMPLEMENTATION 3, 11-13 (May 2007)
[hereinafter FEI 2007 Survey].
141. FEI 2008 Survey, supra note 140, at 5, 6.
142. Id.
143. SEC Release 33-8238, supra note 5. For a discussion of the SEC’s
methodology for that calculation, see supra note 12.
144. FEI provides the following description of the methodology for its 2008 and
2007 surveys. For its 2008 survey:
In late March 2008, FEI sent an e-mail invitation to participate in an Internet-based
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ate roughly 200 responses per year from a range of issuer sizes over the
first four years following Section 404’s implementation. The following
table provides the average results from those surveys for U.S.
accelerated and large accelerated filers: 145
2004
Large accelerated
filers:
No. of responses to
survey
Average internal
costs 146
Average external costs
Average auditor
attestation fees
Total
Accelerated filers:
No. of responses to
survey
Average internal
costs 147
Average external costs
Average auditor
attestation fees
Total

2005

2006

2007

140

136

118

104

$1,851,545

$1,707,205

$1,200,421

$748,950

$2,319,714
$1,717,134

$1,790,067
$1,932,671

$1,016,204
$1,599,631

$263,954
$1,024,649

$5,887,853

$5,429,943

$3,816,256

$2,037,553

65

102

54

64

$389,350

$401,656

$269,725

$250,820

$618,613
$547,227

$680,829
$645,193

$368,185
$452,737

$249,236
$550,654

$1,555,190

$1,727,678

$1,090,647

$1,050,710

survey to 3,566 FEI members from publicly-held companies. Those usable responses
(185) received by April 7, 2008, were included in the survey results. This is a
response rate of about 5.2%.

FEI 2008 Survey, supra note 140, at 10.
For its 2007 survey:
In early April 2007, FEI sent an e-mail invitation to participate in an Internet-based
survey to FEI members from publicly-held companies. Those usable responses (200)
received by April 24, 2007, were included in the survey results.

FEI 2007 Survey, supra note 140, at 10.
145.
Source for the 2007 figures: FEI 2008 Survey, supra note 140, at 12. Source
for the 2004 – 2006 figures: FEI 2007 Survey, supra note 140, at 13.
146. FEI asks respondents to provide the total number of internal people hours that
are dedicated to Section 404 compliance, then assumes full-time professionals at 2,000
hours per year at a compensation rate (salary plus benefits) of $100,000 per year. Id. at
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It should be noted that surveys are notoriously troublesome and can
contain serious data distortions, so the findings from the FEI surveys
should be taken with at least some degree of skepticism. For example,
the issuers who chose to participate in the FEI survey changed from year
to year; yet FEI does not report how much a “different group of firms
responding to each survey” impacted the change in compliance costs. 148
It also remains unclear whether FEI’s surveys were adequately designed
to exclude increased costs from Section 302 compliance into its survey
of Section 404 compliance costs. Nevertheless, the FEI surveys do provide credible evidence that Section 404 direct compliance costs are significant. Specifically, Section 404 compliance costs are certainly much
higher than the $91,000 initially estimated by the SEC. The FEI surveys
also support the notion that issuers and auditors may be adapting to
Section 404 and becoming more efficient at implementing and assessing
ICFR. From 2005 to 2007, the FEI surveys show a 62.5% decrease in
direct compliance costs for large accelerated filers, and a 39.2%
decrease for accelerated filers.
Other surveys that have been conducted support these basic insights, 149 which can be summarized as follows:
•

•

Section 404 significantly increased accounting and audit costs
for all companies (both large and small) that have had to comply
with its provisions.
Efficiencies have been achieved by both large and smaller
issuers that have reduced the direct compliance costs somewhat.

Thus, some of the initial concern over Section 404 direct costs
appears to have been triggered by one-time, exceptional expenses that
4, 11-13.
147. FEI asks respondents to provide the total number of internal people hours that
are dedicated to Section 404 compliance, then assumes full-time professionals at 2,000
hours per year at a compensation rate (salary plus benefits) of $100,000 per year. Id. at
4, 11-13.
148. Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 12.
149. See, e.g., CRA INT’L INC., SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 COSTS AND
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES: SPRING 2006 SURVEY (Apr. 17, 2006) available at http://pola
ris.umuc.edu/~kklose/website/Sox%20404.pdf; CRA INT’L INC., SARBANES-OXLEY
SECTION 404 COSTS AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES: SURVEY UPDATE (Dec. 8, 2005),
available at www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_investorcenter_CRAIIfinal.pdf.
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issuers faced in order to develop and implement systems for documenting internal controls that comply with Section 404. These expenses
were amplified for smaller companies, as it appears that Section 404
caused many of them to document their internal controls for the first
time in the 2004 – 2005 period, 150 even though internal accounting control systems had been required for public companies since 1977. 151
Going forward, it will be interesting to see whether issuers can squeeze
further efficiencies out of their Section 404 direct compliance costs (the
SEC is trying to help this initiative via its new interpretive guidelines 152
and AS 5 153 ) or whether the major efficiencies have already been
captured.
As non-accelerated filers begin to comply with Section 404, it will
also be interesting to examine their experience with initial Section 404
costs. On the one hand, one should expect their initial development and
implementation expenses to be somewhat reduced due to the accumulation of knowledge that has been generated by accelerated filers. On
the other hand, there are thousands of non-accelerated filers who will
now need auditor attestations for fiscal years ending on or after
December 15, 2009. It is plausible that the increased demand for auditor
attestations by non-accelerated filers could cause an increase in auditing
costs generally as auditors seek to meet this increased demand. 154

150.
151.

GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 5.
Exchange Act §§ 13(b)(2)(A), (B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A), (B), which were
implemented as part of the FCPA in 1977. Section 13(b)(2)(A) requires reporting companies to “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). Section 13(b)(2)(B) requires reporting companies to “devise
and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable
assurances that . . . (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation
of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or
any other criteria applicable to such statement, and (II) to maintain accountability for
assets.” 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(ii)(I), (II).
152. SEC Interpretive Release 33-8810, supra note 74, at 1.
153. Supra note 81.
154. See generally Keith Crandell, Board Director for the National Venture Capital
Association, Written Testimony to House Small Business Committee, Hearing on
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Relief (May 4, 2006), available at http://www.nvca.org/
pdf/Crandell%20Testimony%205-3-06.pdf.
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C. Indirect Compliance Costs Difficult to Calculate,
but may be Substantial
In addition to its direct compliance costs, which have received
much attention, Section 404 also involves substantial indirect costs.
Many of these indirect costs are easy to identify, but unlike the direct
costs, they are unfortunately much more difficult to value. One of the
more commonly cited indirect costs is the management time and energy
dedicated to Section 404 that could be spent elsewhere. Professors
Butler and Ribstein point out that “management energy and resources
are scarce. What is spent on SOX compliance is not spent on other
activities that may be more valuable to the firm and to society.”155
For smaller companies, where senior management is often relied
upon to actively manage the day-to-day operations of the issuer, these
lost opportunity costs could be substantial. According to the GAO
Report:
[S]ome of the smaller companies that responded to our survey
reported that their CFOs and accounting staff spent as much as 90
percent of their time for the period leading up to their first Section
404 report on Sarbanes-Oxley Act compliance-related issues.
Finally, many of the smaller companies incurred missed “opportunity costs” to comply with the act that were significant. For example,
nearly half (47 percent) of the companies that responded to our survey reported deferring or canceling operational improvements and
more than one-third (39 percent) indicated that they deferred or
156
cancelled information technology investments.

Another commonly-cited indirect cost was expressed by Keith
Crandell, director for the National Venture Capital Association, in his
May 4, 2006 testimony before the House Small Business Committee regarding the impact of Section 404 on small companies:

155.
156.

BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 50.
GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 17.
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[A]t a time when small companies need their accounting firms more
than ever, Section 404 has created an unhealthy motivational shift in
the accounting profession as it relates to supply and demand. In
response to Sarbanes-Oxley, the [“Big Four” auditors] I am familiar
with have shifted their focus on auditing companies of all sizes to
leveraging lucrative 404 practices at large corporations. Thus they
are abandoning the smaller companies whose needs are equally as
157
critical.

PART IV: WHETHER SECTION 404 IS COST-EFFECTIVE IS LESS CLEAR
While Section 404’s costs are well-documented, quantifying its
benefits has proven difficult, which leads critics and supporters to argue
over the cost-benefit implications of Section 404. 158 Critics decry that
Section 404 “has gone too far” and point to: (1) the substantial compliance costs, reasoning that it is unrealistic to expect that Section 404
generates sufficient benefits to offset those costs, and (2) anecdotal evidence that suggests that smaller reporting companies are employing strategies to avoid being subject to Section 404. Conversely, proponents for
Section 404 tend to focus on the beneficial impact that Section 404
should have on investor protection and on an issuer’s cost of capital.
This Part IV will attempt to sift through evidence on Section 404’s net
effect.
A. Management Surveys Suggest that Section 404 is Cost-Ineffective
A number of surveys have been conducted asking management of
issuers subject to Section 404 to provide perceptions of the provision’s
net effect. The findings from three of the more frequently cited of those
management surveys follow.
1. FEI Survey
The FEI surveys covering 2005 and 2006 asked survey participants
whether the benefits of compliance with Section 404 exceeded their
costs. That question generated the following results: 159

157.
158.
159.

Crandell, supra note 154.
See CCMR REPORT, supra note 3, at 115.
FEI 2007 Survey, supra note 140, at 19.
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Large accelerate filers
Number of responses
Benefits of Section 404 exceed
costs for their company:
Agree
Disagree
Accelerated filers
Number of responses
Benefits of Section 404 exceed
costs for their company:
Agree
Disagree

365

2006

136

118

17.7%
82.3%

21.1%
78.9%

102

54

11.2%
88.8%

23.5%
76.5%

Respondents to the FEI survey covering 2007, however, expressed
“more confidence in the value of Section 404,” 160 in particular those
respondents that were accelerated (rather than large accelerated) filers.

160.

FEI 2008 Survey, supra note 140, at 9.
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2006 161
54

2007 162
64

Large
Accelerated Filers
2006 163
2007 164
118
104

33.3%
66.7%

51.8%
48.2%

51.4%
48.6%

49.5%
50.5%

39.2%
60.8%

55.4%
44.6%

52.3%
47.7%

56.4%
43.6%

29.4%
70.6%

41.1%
58.9%

36.4%
63.6%

45.2%
54.8%

58.0%
42.0%

69.1%
30.9%

60.6%
39.4%

69.1%
30.9%

Accelerated Filers
Number of Responses
Financial reports are more accurate
as a result of Section 404:
Agree
Disagree
Financial reports are more reliable
as a result of Section 404:
Agree
Disagree
Section 404 helped prevent or
detect fraud:
Agree
Disagree
Section 404 has generated more
investor confidence in your
financial reports:
Agree
Disagree

Vol. XIV

2. Rittenberg/Miller Survey
Professor Larry Rittenberg and Patricia Miller published a survey in
2005 that was aimed at capturing the benefits of Section 404. 165 The
Rittenberg/Miller survey asked participants for their opinion regarding
the relative costs and benefits associated with Section 404 compliance,
and generated the following results from 171 respondents (which were
predominantly larger companies): 166
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

FEI 2007 Survey, supra note 140, at 18.
FEI 2008 Survey, supra note 140, at 16.
FEI 2007 Survey, supra note 140, at 18.
FEI 2008 Survey, supra note 140, at 16.
Larry E. Rittenberg & Patricia K. Miller, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Work –
Looking at the Benefits, THE IIA RESEARCH FOUNDATION (Jan. 2005), available at
http://www.theiia.org/research/research-reports/chronological-listing-research-reports/
downloadable-research-reports/?i=248.
166. The 171 responses consisted of 54 from companies with more than $6 billion in
annual sales (or 31.6%), 64 from companies with annual sales between $1 billion and
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Costs greatly exceed
benefits
Costs exceed benefits
Costs equal benefits
Benefits exceed costs
Benefits greatly exceed
costs

367

First year effort to
get ready for
Section 404

Ignoring the year-one
start-up costs and looking
forward to steady state of
control assessments

37%

6%

35%
14%
13%
1%

30%
25%
31%
8%

3. Foley & Lardner Survey
Foley & Lardner LLP has been conducting annual surveys to gauge
the impact of corporate governance reform on public companies since
2003. 167 The 2006 survey generated 114 responses from public companies (33 from issuers with annual revenue of $1 billion or more; 80 from
issuers with annual revenue of less than $1 billion; 1 company did not
specify). 168 The Foley & Lardner surveys included the following question that relates somewhat to the cost/benefits of Section 404: 169

$6 billion (or 37.4%), 42 from companies with annual sales between $200 million and
$1 billion (or 24.6%) and 4 from companies with less than $200 million in annual sales
(or 2.3%). Seven of the respondents did not report their annual sales. Id. at 5.
167. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, THE COST OF BEING PUBLIC IN THE ERA OF SARBANESOXLEY 18 (June 15, 2006), available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/
FileUpload137/3420/ndi%202006%20public%20study%20FINAL.pdf
(Foley
&
Lardner worked with the national research firm KRC Research on the survey).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 12.
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Do you feel that the corporate
governance and public disclosure
reforms implemented since the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
in 2002 are too strict, or not strict
enough?
Too strict
About right
Not strict enough
Don’t know/no answer

55%
38%
5%
3%

2004

67%
27%
2%
4%

Vol. XIV

2005

2006

82%
16%
2%
–

82%
18%
–
1%

The above responses would seem to reflect a growing dissatisfaction with SOX reforms and their costs. In 2006, Foley & Lardner
included the following two new questions: 170
2006
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The
cost of Sarbanes-Oxley Act compliance has resulted in budget
and/or staffing cuts in critical areas of my business.
Agree
Disagree
Don’t know/no answer
[Only asked of those agreeing with the above statement] To
what extent do you agree or disagree with the following
statement: The cost of Sarbanes-Oxley Act compliance has
negatively impacted my organization’s earnings.
Agree
Disagree

34%
65%
1%

95%
5%

4. Interpreting the Findings from the Various Surveys
Together, these surveys provide very inconclusive evidence regarding Section 404’s net effect and should be interpreted cautiously. At
first glance, the surveys seem to offer support to the Section 404 critics,
as they provide evidence that public company executives do not find

170.

Id. at 14.
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Section 404 to be cost-effective. There are a number of problems with
that conclusion, however. First, the surveys suffer from many of the
typical problems that plague surveys, such as a small sample size. More
significantly, the surveys do not necessarily ask the right party about
whether Section 404 is cost-effective. Issuer executives are particularly
well-suited to determine the costs associated with Section 404, since the
issuer bears most of the costs associated with Section 404. Issuer executives, however, are not necessarily well-suited to estimate the benefits
that derive from the provision. Section 404 is designed primarily to
benefit investors, not issuer management, so issuer management may be
less capable of judging the benefits. Moreover, these executives should
be expected to be biased against Section 404 for a number of reasons
wholly unrelated to the actual effectiveness of the regulation. In particular, Section 404 generates immediate and concrete monetary costs to
the issuer, while the benefits, in the form of reduced information and
agency problems, are not immediate and concrete, and are actually an
implicit criticism of management’s competence and honesty. It should
be expected, therefore, that many executives will want to find that their
financial data is no more accurate post-Section 404 than it was preSection 404.
B. Section 404 Avoidance Strategies Also Suggest that
Section 404 is Cost-Ineffective
Since SOX applies only to reporting companies, firms that wish to
avoid Section 404 because they find it cost-ineffective may engage in
strategies to avoid being a reporting company. Section 404 critics point
to three public market trends that developed post-SOX: (i) an increase in
“going-dark” transactions by smaller reporting companies; (ii) a reduction in U.S. IPOs by smaller companies; and (iii) an increase in U.S.
smaller companies conducting IPOs on foreign stock markets (in
particular the AIM market in London).
1. Increase in Going-Dark Transactions
The Exchange Act subjects companies with a class of registered
securities (frequently referred to as “reporting” companies) to an elaborate regulatory system that includes periodic reporting requirements 171 ,
171.

Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a); Exchange Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §
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federal proxy rules 172 , federal tender offer rules 173 , the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act 174 and SOX. For reporting companies that wish to free
themselves from this regulatory system (including the requirements of
SOX and Section 404), the Exchange Act also provides them with the
ability to “deregister” their securities.
Section 12(g)(4) of the Exchange Act provides that companies with
a class of registered securities may terminate the registration if the
number of “holders of record” for that class of securities falls below
300. 175 Interestingly, the provision focuses on “holders of record” rather
than “beneficial owners.” The beneficial owner is the person one typically thinks of as the “real” owner of the security (e.g., the investor who
purchased the security and enjoys the “benefits” of ownership such as
collecting dividends and voting the shares), 176 while the holder of
record, in contrast, is the party in whose name the securities are held on
the books of the issuer or its transfer agent. 177 For example, when an
investor buys securities through a brokerage firm, most brokerage firms
will hold those securities in “street name,” 178 which means the brokerage
firm will hold the securities in its name, and not in the name of the
investor. 179 Thus, the investor is the beneficial owner of the securities,
and the brokerage firm is the holder of record. Because publicly-held
securities are predominantly held in street name, 180 even public companies of a significant size and with multiple thousands of beneficial shareholders may still be eligible for deregistration. If the class of securities
the issuer is trying to deregister is listed on a national securities ex-

78o(d).
172. Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
173. Exchange Act §§ 13(d), (e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(e), n(d)-(f).
174. FCPA, supra note 45.
175. Exchange Act § 12(g)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(4); Exchange Act Rule 12g-4(a),
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4(a). For issuers whose total assets have not exceeded $10 million
on the last day of each of the issuer’s three most recent fiscal years, the issuer may seek
to terminate registration for a class of securities when held of record by less than 500
persons. Exchange Act Rule 12g-4(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4(a).
176. Investopedia, “Beneficial owner”, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bene
ficialowner.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
177. Exchange Act Rule 12g-5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1.
178. SEC, On-Line Publications for Investors, Holding Your Securities – Get the
Facts, available at http://sec.gov/investor/pubs/holdsec.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
179. Id.
180. See Hazen, supra note 45, at 329, n. 13.
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change, the issuer must also delist those securities from that exchange. 181
Issuers can “deregister” through two basic methods:
Going private: An issuer “goes private” when it discontinues public trading of its securities and becomes a private company. 182 This
could be accomplished through a number of techniques, including encouraging an unrelated private company to acquire the issuer (e.g.,
through a private equity transaction 183 ), conducting a management buyout or conducting a transaction that involves a combination of both. For
example, the wave of leveraged-buyouts in the 1980s that were
conducted by private equity investors (a.k.a. buyout firms) and managers
were classic examples of “going-private” transactions.
Going dark: An issuer “goes dark” when it deregisters its securities, but continues to maintain public trading in those securities through
the OTC markets. 184 Going-dark transactions can be accomplished by
cashing out enough security holders (typically shareholders) to reduce
the holders of record to less than 300, but leaving enough beneficial
owners of the securities to allow for some level of OTC trading.

181. There are ten securities exchanges registered with the SEC as national
securities exchanges under Section 6 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f: New York
Stock Exchange, Nasdaq Stock Market LLC, American Stock Exchange, Boston Stock
Exchange, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Chicago Stock Exchange, International
Securities Exchange, National Stock Exchange (formerly the Cincinnati Stock
Exchange), NYSE Arca (formerly the Pacific Stock Exchange) and the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange. For a helpful discussion on delisting, see BAINBRIDGE GUIDE TO SOX,
supra note 10, at 223-34.
182. Christian Leuz, Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really this Costly? A
Discussion of Evidence from Event Returns and Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT.
& ECON., 146, 149 (2007).
183. This Article is using the term “private equity” as it is commonly employed in
the U.S. financial markets. Namely, private equity refers to large buyout funds (e.g.,
The Blackstone Group, The Carlyle Group, KKR, or the Texas Pacific Group) that seek
to acquire a substantial ownership stake in operating companies. In addition to
providing financial capital, private equity investors typically take a very active role in
the management of the firms in which they invest. See, e.g., Private Equity: Frequently
Asked Question, http://www.privateequitycouncil.org/just-the-facts/private-equity
frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
184. Leuz, supra note 182, at 149.
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In addition to regulatory avoidance, a multitude of other reasons
can motivate a reporting company to “go private,” 185 including the benefit of managerial expertise or other synergies of a strategic partner, or
the desire to undertake a higher risk strategy for the firm that might not
be appreciated by external shareholders. Going-dark transactions,
however, appear to be motivated entirely by a desire for regulatory
avoidance.
(a) Available Data
A number of studies have been conducted to try to determine
whether deregistrations increased post-SOX, potentially indicating that
firms were seeking to avoid being subject to SOX. While the various
studies employed different methodologies, they universally found a
substantial increase in post-SOX deregistrations. The following are
summaries of five such studies.
(1) Leuz, Triantis and Wang Study
Professors Christian Leuz, Alexander Triantis and Tracy Wang
compared a sample of 484 firms that went dark and 436 firms that went
private between January 1998 and December 2004 to a sample of firms
that remained reporting companies. 186 Leuz, Triantis and Wang found a
significant increase in going-dark transactions in 2003 and 2004, 187 but
no discernable increase in going-private transactions during that
period. 188 The study also found that going-dark firms tend to exhibit the
following characteristics:
189
 They are smaller firms.
 They have “poorer stock market performance, higher leverage,
and fewer growth opportunities than the population of firms that
could but choose not to go dark. They also exhibit higher levels
of distress and experience a decline in capital market interest.” 190
185.
186.

Id.
Christian Leuz, Alexander Triantis & Tracy Wang, Why do Firms Go Dark?
Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations, 45 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 181, 187-89 (2008).
187. Id. at 189.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 190, 204.
190. Id. at 204. Distress was measured by examining: (1) a distress score from a
bankruptcy prediction model; (2) increases in short-term debt; (3) unreported
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They have a lower level of institutional ownership. 191
Finally, they have “larger (positive and negative) accruals relative to their cash flow from operations (consistent with poorer
accounting quality and hiding motives), larger free cash flow
problems, and weaker board governance and outside monitoring.” 192

Based on their findings, Leuz, Triantis and Wang concluded that
many firms went dark “in response to poor future prospects, financial
distress and increased compliance costs after SOX.” 193 They also found
“evidence suggesting that controlling insiders take their firms dark to
protect private control benefits and decrease outside scrutiny, particularly when governance and investor protection are weak.” 194
(2) Engel, Hayes and Wang Study
Professors Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes and Xue Wang examined
a sample of 470 firms that went private or went dark from January 1998
through May 2005 195 and filed a Schedule 13E-3. 196 The study did not
include foreign private issuers or firms that deregistered due to
liquidation or bankruptcy. Engel, Hayes and Wang found an increase in
the quarterly frequency of deregistrations – including both going-private
and going-dark transactions – after the passage of SOX. 197 In analyzing
the data, however, Professors Kamar, Karaca-Mandic and Talley found
that the increase became insignificant when going-dark transactions

regressions showing a large drop in Return on Assets; and (4) a lower cash to total
assets ratio. Id. at 191. For details on the bankruptcy prediction model, see James A.
Ohlson, Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy, 18 J. ACCT.
RES. 109 (1980).
191. Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 193, 194, n.13.
192. Id. at 205.
193. Id. at 181.
194. Id.
195. Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes & Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON., 116, 125-26 (2007).
196. Schedule 13E-3s under the Exchange Act are filed for transactions conducted
under Exchange Act Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3. Rule 13e-3 transactions
involve deregistrations conducted by an issuer or its affiliates as opposed to an outsider.
Rule 13e-3(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(3).
197. Engel et al., supra note 195, at 143.
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were excluded. 198 Finally, Engel, Hayes and Wang found that smaller
firms with high insider ownership that announced their deregistration
post-SOX experienced higher returns at the announcement than similar
firms that announced their deregistration pre-SOX, 199 which could
indicate that SOX was imposing a net negative effect on the deregistering companies.
(3) GAO Report
The GAO Report included a deregistration analysis as part of its
study on the impact of SOX on smaller reporting companies. 200 The
GAO Report examined deregistrations (both going-private and goingdark transactions) that took place from 1998 through the first quarter of
2005. 201 The report did not, however, include firms that deregistered
securities other than common stock, companies that were headquartered
in a foreign country, or companies that deregistered due to merger into
another company, bankruptcy or liquidation. 202 The GAO Report found
that deregistrations increased from 143 in 2001 to 245 in 2004 203 – although the numbers are slightly lower if blank check 204 and shell
companies 205 are excluded. 206 In addition to noting an increase in deregistrations, the GAO Report analyzed the reasons that companies

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 19.
Engel et al., supra note 195, at 143.
GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 21-25, 73-83.
Id. at 22.
Id. 74-77.
Id. at 21, 76.
“A blank check company is a development stage company that has no specific
business plan or purpose or has indicated its business plan is to engage in a merger or
acquisition with an unidentified company or companies, other entity, or person.” Blank
Check Companies, http://www.sec.gov/answers/blankcheck.htm (last visited Jan. 14,
2009).
205. A shell company is a reporting company “with no or nominal operations and
either no or nominal assets, assets consisting solely of cash and cash equivalents, or
assets consisting of any amount of cash and cash equivalents and nominal other assets.”
SEC, Final Rule: Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies,
Release Nos. 33-8587, 34-52038, Int’l Series Release No. 1293, 17 C.F.R. Parts 230,
239, 240, 249 (July 15, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8587.pdf.
206. GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 76-77.
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reported for deregistering. 207 The following table provides a summary
of those reported reasons from the GAO Report: 208
Direct
Costs
of being
Reporting
Co.

Indirect
Costs
of being
Reporting
Co.

Market/Liquidity
Issues

Private
Company
Benefits

No
Reason
Cited

(% of companies that cited it as a reason for their deregistration)
Q1
2005

62.2

28.9

28.9

8.9

27.8

2004
2003
2002

52.7
57.8
44.4

25.7
27.5
13.9

28.6
38.5
35.4

15.9
21.3
22.9

38.4
31.6
45.1

2001
2000
1999

32.2
20.0
33.3

13.3
11.1
12.2

31.5
32.2
33.3

23.8
37.8
42.2

49.0
38.9
37.8

1998

12.3

5.3

14.0

26.3

54.4

The most striking result from the “reasons” study is the significant
increase in companies that attribute their decision to deregister to the
costs associated with being a reporting company, coupled with a corresponding decrease in companies citing private company benefits.
Finally, the GAO Report analyzed where companies that deregistered from July 2003 through the end of March 2005 were trading
prior to deregistration. The following table provides a summary of the
results: 209

NYSE
1.8%

AMEX
5.3%

Pink
Sheets
13.6%

NASDAQ
17.6%

No Public
Trading
Market
24.8%

OTCBB
36.9%

207. The GAO used various sources to identify these reported reasons, including
SEC filings, press releases and newswire announcements. Id. at 79.
208. Id. at 23.
209. Id. at 24-25.
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(4) Block Study
Professor Stanley B. Block surveyed 110 formerly Nasdaq-listed
companies that deregistered (including both going-private and goingdark transactions) between January 2001 and July 2003 to determine
why they deregistered. 210 Ninety-six of the firms that participated in the
Block study had market capitalizations below $100 million prior to
deregistering. 211 The survey generated the following primary reasons
for deregistration: 212

Cost of being public as opposed to being
private
Pressures and time constraints for top
management
Lack of coverage by security analysts
Absence of liquidity in the public market
No opportunity for a secondary market
Threat of delisting by the Nasdaq market

No. of companies that
responded it was the primary
reason for deregistering
33
21
19
14
12
11

(5) Marosi and Massoud Study
Finally, Professors András Marosi and Nadia Massoud examined a
sample of 406 firms that deregistered from 1996 through May 2004 to
determine why they went dark. Marosi and Massoud did not include
firms that filed a Form 15 to deregister only their preferred stock or
publicly traded bonds, foreign companies, or companies that deregistered due to merger, bankruptcy or liquidation. 213 The study found that
the recent deregistration trend is primarily a going-dark phenomenon,
“[u]nlike the wave of LBOs in the 1980s and 1990s.” 214 They also
210. Stanley B. Block, The Latest Movement to Going Private: An Empirical Study,
14 J. APPLIED FIN. 36, 36 (2004).
211. Id. at 38.
212. Id. at 40.
213. András Marosi & Nadia Massoud, Why Do Firms Go Dark?, 42(2) J. FIN.&
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 421, 426 (2007).
214. Id. at 423.

2009

THE CASE AGAINST EXEMPTING
SMALLER REPORTING COMPANIES

377

found that “firms with fewer growth opportunities, greater insider
ownership, lower institutional ownership, lower market momentum, and
higher leverage are . . . more likely to go dark”215 and that the audit costs
of complying with SOX were “among the major driving forces behind a
firms’ decision to go dark.” 216
(b) Basic Picture of Post-SOX Deregistration Phenomenon
The above studies yield the following basic picture of the recent
deregistration phenomenon:
The Post-SOX increase in deregistrations has been driven by goingdark transactions: There is little doubt that deregistrations increased
following the enactment of SOX. Unlike the deregistration trend in the
1980s and 1990s, however, which primarily involved LBO-driven
going-private transactions, the post-SOX increase in deregistrations
stemmed from going-dark transactions. 217
Smaller, weaker firms have gone dark: Going-dark firms have been
predominantly smaller firms. 218 Moreover, these going-dark firms have
also tended to be “weaker” firms. Specifically, they tend to have weaker
recent stock performance, higher leverage, and exhibit higher distress.
They also tend to have lower growth opportunities and frequently decide
to go dark after experiencing a decline in capital market value. 219 While
some of the going-dark firms were listed on one of the major markets in
the United States (i.e., NYSE, Nasdaq or Amex), a substantial percentage of the post-SOX going-dark firms were not. Instead, they were
trading over-the-counter on either the OTC Bulletin Board or the Pink
Sheets, or had no public trading market at all. 220 Presumably, these
companies were never listed on a major market because they were not
strong enough to satisfy the listing requirements for one of the major
markets.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 441.
Id.
Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 189; Marosi & Massoud, supra note 213, at 423.
Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 190, 204.
Id. at 204; Marosi & Massoud, supra note 213, at 441.
GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 24-25.
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Going-dark firms suffered from greater agency problems: The
going-dark firms appear to present greater agency problems to external
equity investors. First, going-dark firms had fewer independent directors, 221 which increased the opportunities for insiders to capture the
firm’s assets at the expense of outside shareholders. Going-dark firms
also tended to have fewer effective external mechanisms for monitoring
management performance, as these firms tended to have a lower level of
institutional ownership. 222 Finally (and not surprisingly, once one considers the greater agency problems), going-dark firms tended to have
poorer accounting quality. 223
Going-dark firms cited regulatory burden as a significant factor in
their decision to go dark: While companies cite a number of reasons for
going dark, the direct costs associated with being a public company,
including the audit costs required to comply with SOX, is one of the
most frequently cited reasons. 224
(c) Impact of SOX (and Section 404) – Possible Interpretations
Interpreting this data to determine the impact that SOX and Section
404 had on the going-dark phenomenon is not a simple task. Quite
simply, a multitude of factors affected firms’ decisions to go dark, and
there is no mechanism for specifically isolating the effect of SOX or
Section 404. 225 For example, consider the substantial number of goingdark firms that had never been listed on a major stock market and had
instead always been relegated to the OTC Bulletin Board or the Pink
Sheets. Since securities that trade on those markets frequently suffer
from substantial liquidity problems and are less likely to be attractive as
targets for potential acquisitions, the poor quality of their public market
experience may have been the primary driver in their decision to go
dark, irrespective of the implementation of SOX.
Accepting the difficulty in isolating the specific impact of SOX and
Section 404, there are a few plausible theories that have been offered to
explain SOX’s impact on the going-dark phenomenon and which find
221.
222.
223.
224.

See Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 194.
See id. at 193, 194, n.13.
See id. at 205.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 23; Block, supra note 210, at 37, 40;
Marosi & Massoud, supra note 213, at 441.
225. See Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 2-3.
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support in the available data. Two of the more prominent theories will
be referred to in this Article as (1) the “cost saving” hypothesis 226 and
(2) the “private benefits” hypothesis. 227
(1) Cost Saving Hypothesis
The cost saving hypothesis looks at the net effect of SOX and
Section 404 on public issuers and assumes that an issuer’s management
will be motivated solely by its duty to maximize shareholder value. 228
Under this theory, a public issuer’s management will look to deregister
if it determines that the additional costs imposed by SOX cause the total
costs associated with being a reporting company to outweigh the
benefits. 229 Since Section 404 is generally considered to be the most
expensive of SOX’s provisions, it could be the tipping point that causes
management to determine that the public securities regulatory scheme
has now become too costly. In short, one can view the cost saving
hypothesis as an attempt by management to “increase shareholder value
by ceasing to file with the SEC when the net benefit of such reporting
has become negative.” 230
The available data supports the cost saving hypothesis in a number
of ways. The data strongly suggests that going-dark companies have a
decreased ability to access the public capital markets for further capital
due to their weak performance. It is also possible that going-dark companies have less need for accessing the public equity markets due to
their tendency toward lower growth rates. Since external equity is typically used to fund an issuer’s projected growth, companies with lowgrowth potential should be expected to have less need for such external
equity funding. All told, the available data suggests that, on a relative
basis, going-dark companies may not derive a very high level of benefit
from being a reporting company. 231 At the same time, going-dark companies appear to be the least capable of absorbing the additional regulatory costs imposed by SOX and Section 404, since: (1) their tendency
toward economic distress indicates they are less likely to be able to deal
with the increased burden, and (2) their small size suggests that the
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 185.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Engel et al., supra note 195, at 118.
Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 185.
Id. at 204.
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regulatory burden hits them disproportionately harder than larger firms.
The GAO Report’s survey evidence provides further support for the cost
saving hypothesis, as it indicates that the costs associated with being a
public company – including the audits costs required to comply with
SOX – were a significant determinant in firms’ decisions to
deregister. 232
It is important to note, however, that SOX is not the only factor that
can change the balance between the costs and benefits of being a reporting company. There are a multitude of factors wholly unrelated to
Section 404 that might reduce the benefits of being a reporting company
so dramatically that it is no longer cost-effective to be a reporting company. 233 Consider a Pink Sheet company with the following realistic
characteristics: (1) the issuer operates in a sector that is currently not
favored by the market; (2) the issuer has no analyst coverage; (3) there is
limited secondary-market liquidity for its shares, and manipulative secondary trading practices appear to be taking place involving the issuer’s
shares; and (4) the issuer’s profitability recently took a hit and the issuer
forecasts slower growth going forward. In such a setting, the net benefit
of being a reporting company may be negative, irrespective of any
additional costs generated by Section 404 compliance.
(2) Private Benefits Hypothesis
The private benefits hypothesis offers a plausible alternative theory
to the cost saving hypothesis. Under the private benefits hypothesis,
management does not receive the altruistic assumption that they will
focus solely on maximizing shareholder value. Instead, the private benefits rationale considers whether the decision to go dark may be driven
instead by “insiders’ interests, rather than the pursuit of [higher]
shareholder value.” 234 The Leuz, Triantis and Wang study describes the
theory as follows:
Controlling insiders, such as managers or large owners, could take
the firm dark to avoid the outside scrutiny that comes with, or is
greatly facilitated by, SEC reporting. After going dark, insiders may
increase their private benefits of control, including perk consumption, loans on favorable terms, generous compensation pack-

232.
233.
234.

See GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 21-23.
See Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 21.
Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 185.
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ages, the investment of free cash flows into projects that serve
insiders’ interests, or self-dealing with other companies in which
insiders hold stakes. And even for firms that generate little cash that
insiders could directly or indirectly appropriate, going dark can offer
insiders more entrenchment and less outsider interference. Without
SEC reporting, it is easier to extract and protect these private
benefits, and the expected (private) costs of detection are lower.
Conversely, regulatory events that extend firms’ reporting requirements or strengthen their enforcement . . . can increase the expected
costs to insiders of being a registered company, which in turn can
235
trigger the decision to go dark.

In short, the private benefits hypothesis predicts that companies that
suffer from greater agency problems and private control benefits should
be expected to implement regulatory avoidance strategies (such as going
dark) when regulations improve outsiders’ ability to detect and take
action against those problems. The available going-dark data also supports the private benefits hypothesis, as going-dark firms have tended to
suffer from greater agency problems. As noted earlier, these firms tend
to have greater concentrations of inside shareholders, fewer independent
directors, fewer effective external mechanisms for monitoring management performance, and poorer accounting quality. 236
(3) Addressing the Lemons Problem
We are left, then, with two plausible theories that offer different
explanations for SOX’s role in the going-dark phenomenon. Under the
cost saving rationale, SOX may have harmed smaller companies by
disproportionately increasing their regulatory burden and making it too
expensive for them to remain as reporting companies. Even if that is the
case, some have questioned whether that is actually a bad outcome. 237
The key factor for going-dark firms may not be their smallness, but
rather their “weakness.” Perhaps encouraging these weaker firms to deregister provides a signal not only of their weakness, but also of the
greater strength of those smaller companies that are able to remain
reporting companies. 238
Under the private benefits hypothesis, SOX and Section 404 can
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
See supra Part IV.B.1.(a)-(b).
See, e.g., Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 9-11, 27.
See id.
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also be viewed in a positive light, as the increased regulation can be
interpreted as providing an improved mechanism for monitoring management performance, which once again will tend to encourage weaker
companies to flee this increased scrutiny. Professors Butler and Ribstein
raise a legitimate concern about this outcome of chasing away
companies with weaker corporate governance structures:
Even before SOX, insiders could try to avoid disclosure obligations
by going private and dark. But SOX’s higher disclosure costs now
give them a legitimate explanation. Even if this is the real explanation, SOX would be indirectly causing a loss of securities law
239
protection for precisely those shareholders who need it most.

This author suggests, however, that the real culprit for increasing
corporate governance requirements (thereby chasing out weaker companies), in such a scenario is not Section 404. Instead, the real culprits are
Exchange Act Sections 12(g)(1) and (4) and Rules 12g-1 and -4, for
focusing on “record” holders rather than “beneficial” holders, thereby
allowing for public secondary markets in securities that do not meet
minimum standards for corporate governance.
All told, if Section 404 serves to encourage weaker small
companies to leave the public markets – particularly if problems with
Exchange Act Section 12(g)(1) and (4) and Rules 12g-1 and -4 are
resolved – that could help to reduce a potential lemons problem for
smaller companies, by creating a mechanism that allows stronger smaller companies to differentiate themselves from the weaker ones. 240
2. Substantial Decrease in U.S. IPOs by Smaller Companies
If Section 404 is as cost-ineffective as many of its critics claim it to
be, its impact should be felt by more than just existing public companies.
Private companies that are in a position to access the U.S. public
markets through an IPO and become reporting companies should also be
expected to exhibit SOX-avoidance strategies. Specifically, if a significant number of IPO-eligible private companies actively seek to avoid
U.S. IPOs, that phenomenon could be another indication that Section

239.
240.

BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 55.
The impact of asymmetric information on markets and the resulting “lemons
problem” can be traced back to George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality,
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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404’s costs are not justified. In fact there is evidence to suggest that
U.S. IPO avoidance by smaller companies has occurred post-SOX. The
following table sets forth summary data for the U.S. IPO market since
1990: 241
Year
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990

Number of U.S.
IPOs
159
157
161
174
63
66
80
382
477
284
474
675
458
405
490
397
280
110

Aggregate Proceeds
$35.63 billion
$30.48 billion
$28.33 billion
$31.53 billion
$9.58 billion
$22.03 billion
$34.30 billion
$65.11 billion
$64.79 billion
$33.80 billion
$31.59 billion
$42.25 billion
$30.16 billion
$17.40 billion
$29.29 billion
$21.92 billion
$14.16 billion
$4.27 billion

The year 2000 (and more precisely, the close of the first quarter of
2000) marked the end of one of the hottest IPO markets in U.S. history.
The fact that the window shut on a hot IPO market, however, is nothing
exceptional. IPO markets are highly volatile and have always gone
through hot periods and cold periods. 242 In particular, a cold stock
market should be expected to trigger a cold IPO market. In 2001 and
241. Jay R. Ritter, Some Factoids About the 2008 IPO Market 2 (Working Paper,
Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2008Factoids.pdf [hereinafter Ritter, 2008 IPO Market]. Ritters study and the table above excludes IPOs with an
offer price of less than $5.00, as well as IPOs involving unit offers, closed-end funds,
REITs, partnerships, banks and S&Ls, and stocks not listed on CRSP (which includes
Amex, NYSE, and NASDAQ stocks).
242. See infra notes 248-52 and accompanying text.
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2002, the major stock indices (i.e., the Dow Jones, the S&P 500 and the
Nasdaq Composite indices) suffered substantial losses as each continued
to retreat from the peaks they had achieved during the first quarter of
2000. 243
Peak
Dow Jones
S&P 500
Nasdaq
Composite

11,908
(1/14/00)
1,553
(3/24/00)
5,132
(3/10/00)

Trough
(Oct. 10, 2002)
7181

Percentage
Change
-39.7%

769

-50.5%

1108

-78.4%

In such an environment, a cold IPO market should be expected. A
company will typically seek investment capital when its free cash flows
are insufficient to fund the company’s growth opportunities. An IPO is
one such mechanism for seeking investment capital. Because investment capital is a scarce resource relative to its need, sources of investment capital naturally demand a price for use of their capital. 244 In an
IPO, investors charge that price by demanding an ownership percentage
of the company in exchange for their funds. Just like with any other
good or service, however, the price of IPO investment capital can
fluctuate substantially over time. When the public stock markets are
“hot”, public investors are indicating a desire to part with their investment capital more readily and at valuations that are more favorable to
issuers (i.e., an issuer will be required to part with a smaller percentage
of the company in order to obtain the investment capital). 245 In such a
setting, the cost of equity will be cheaper for many issuers. When the
public stock markets are “cold”, the inverse is true. 246 In a cold market,
public investors are indicating a reduced demand for acquiring public
243. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (select specific index under “Market
Summary,” then “Historical Prices”) [hereinafter Historical Prices].
244. Simply put, there are more parties that would like to receive investment capital
than there is available investment capital. In order to be motivated to part with their
investment capital, these sources of capital will charge the potential users of capital a
price (the cost of capital) to compensate for its use.
245. See generally Douglas Cumming & Jeffrey MacIntosh, Boom, Bust, and
Litigation in Venture Capital Finance, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 867, 877 (2004).
246. See generally id.

2009

THE CASE AGAINST EXEMPTING
SMALLER REPORTING COMPANIES

385

equity, which means the cost of equity will be more expensive for
issuers (i.e., an issuer will be required to part with a greater percentage
of the company in order to obtain the investment capital). Since the
primary reason for conducting an IPO is typically to obtain investment
capital to pursue growth opportunities, an issuer should only conduct an
IPO when the cost of equity from the IPO is justified by the expected
returns from the growth opportunities. Where the cost of equity is particularly expensive, one should expect to see fewer IPOs, as it will require
substantially greater growth opportunities to justify conducting the IPOs.
Viewed in this light, the lack of IPOs in 2001 and 2002 is very understandable.
What is remarkable is how long the U.S. IPO market has remained
cold. In particular, it is surprising to see the U.S. IPO market remain so
cold during a period when the U.S. public stock markets experienced a
substantial recovery, which should indicate that a more favorable cost of
equity would be available for IPO issuers. The following table sets forth
the year-end closes for each of the three major stock indices from 2002
through 2007. 247

Dow Jones
S&P 500
Nasdaq
Composite

2002
8,342
880
1,336

2003
10,454
1,112
2,003

Year End Close
2004
2005
10,783 10,717
1,212
1,248
2,175
2,205

2006
12,463
1,418
2,415

2007
13,265
1,468
2,652

The Dow Jones, S&P 500 and Nasdaq indices each increased from
2003 – 2007 resulting in the following cumulative increases: 248
% Increase:
Close of 2002 – Close of 2007
Dow Jones
S&P 500
Nasdaq Composite

59.0%
66.8%
98.5%

In spite of this strong post-2002 market growth, the U.S. IPO

247.
248.

See Historical Prices, supra note 243.
Id.
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market remained cold. More specifically, the U.S. IPO market remained
“ice cold” for smaller companies. From 2001 – 2007, the U.S. IPO
market posted seven consecutive years with less than 200 IPOs being
completed. Prior to 2001 the last time that less than 200 IPOs were
completed in a year was 1990 and only three times during that 11-year
span were less than 300 IPOs completed. 249 If one eliminates 1999 and
2000 as bubble years, the aggregate proceeds raised by IPOs in 2004
recovered to a very respectable level and maintained that level through
2007, despite the drop in number of the number IPOs compared to the
pre-2001 era. It does not appear, therefore, that large IPOs for large
companies have disappeared; there were twenty IPOs conducted in 2007
with deal sizes of $500 million or more for an aggregate deal size of
more than $20 billion. 250 The big reduction in the number of IPOs,
therefore, clearly stems from fewer U.S. IPOs by smaller companies.
(a) Section 404 may Render Cost of IPO Equity too Expensive
Section 404 critics argue that the increase in costs imposed by
SOX, and specifically by Section 404, is a significant reason for the failure of the U.S. IPO market to rebound for smaller companies. Mark
Heesen, President of the National Venture Capital Association, described the problem during his June 2007 testimony to the House Small
Business Committee regarding Section 404’s impact on smaller
companies, as follows:
[W]e are now seeing companies that have a high enough profit run
rate to consider an IPO choosing to be acquired instead. They want
to rid themselves of the SOX burden [his testimony focused
particularly on Section 404’s burden] which currently remains for
smaller public companies. The result is a long list of companies that
should have been stand alone economic contributors being absorbed
into larger entities. Rather than an IPO on a US exchange being the
ultimate achievement for a venture backed company, it has now

249.
250.

Ritter, 2008 IPO Market, supra note 241, at 2.
Renaissance Capital IPO Home.com, Largest IPOs, http://www.ipohome.com/
marketwatch/biggest.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). The two biggest IPOs were the
June 2007 $4.1 billion IPO by The Blackstone Group and the July 2007 $2.9 billion
IPO by MF Global Ltd. THE BLACKSTONE GROUP L.P., 2007 PROSPECTUS 424(b)(4),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1393818/000104746907005160/
a2178575z424b4.htm; MF GLOBAL LTD., 2007 PROSPECTUS 424(b)(4), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1401106/000119312507158324/d424b4.htm.
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become, at best, one of many options to be considered and, at worst,
an outcome that is actually avoided. Imagine if Google had been
acquired by Microsoft, or Dell by Compaq, or Genentech acquired
by J&J. Perhaps the innovation would have survived but the market
251
value, jobs and revenues would have been diluted substantially.

In effect, Section 404 critics like Heesen argue that Section 404 has
substantially increased the cost of equity for potential IPO issuers by
increasing the regulatory cost of conducting an IPO (and being a
reporting company) without a sufficient corresponding benefit from
Section 404, such as improved valuation for issuers due to the greater
transparency required by Section 404.
To provide some numbers to place this argument in context,
consider the following examples of two IPOs that were conducted by
“smaller” companies in November 2007:

251. Mark G. Heesen, President, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, Testimony before the
House Small Business Committee, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: Will the SEC and
PCAOB’s New Standards Lower Compliance Costs for Small Companies (June 5,
2007), available at http://www.nvca.org/pdf/mheesen-testimony-6-5-07.pdf.

388

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW

Issuer:
Description of Issuer
from Prospectus:

Listing/Quotation:
Amount Sold to
Public:
Post-Money IPO
Valuation of Issuer:
Direct Costs
Associated with IPO:
Underwriting discount
SEC registration fee
FINRA fee
NASDAQ Global
Market listing fee
Printing & mailing fee
Legal fees & expenses
Accounting fees &
expenses
Transfer agent &
registrar fees
Miscellaneous
Total direct costs

SoundBite
Communications, Inc.
A leading provider of ondemand automated voice
messaging solutions. 252

Vol. XIV

Nanosphere, Inc.

NASDAQ Global
Market 254
$41,616,176 256

Develops, manufactures
and markets an advanced
molecular diagnostics
platform that enables
simple, low cost and
highly sensitive genomic
and protein testing on a
single platform. 253
NASDAQ Global
Market 255
$98,000,000 257

$119,950,744 258

$295,665,580 259

$2,913,132
$2,966
$10,160

$6,401,250
$3,955
$13,380

$100,000

$100,000

$125,000
$825,000
$1,050,000

$350,000
$1,600,000
$1,150,000

$15,000

$3,500

$71,874
$5,113,132

$237,540
260

$9,859,625 261

252. SOUNDBITE COMMC’NS PROSPECTUS 424(b)(1), at 1, available at http://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1163698/000095013507006649/b64836b1e424b1.htm
(last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
253. NANOSPHERE PROSPECTUS 424(b)(4), at 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1105184/000095015007000046/a32360b4e424b4.htm (last visited
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Let us make two further assumptions to complete the picture:




Two-thirds of the issuer’s IPO accounting fees and expenses
were due to Section 404 compliance: $700,000 for SoundBite
and $766,667 for Nanosphere.
On a going-forward basis, each issuer will annually incur an
additional $1,000,000 of accounting and auditing expenses
(internal, external and auditor attestation fees) due to Section
404.

Based on these assumptions – which coincide with the available
data on Section 404 compliance costs (and could possibly overstate
those costs) – each of the issuers will incur slightly under $6 million
over the next five years in Section 404 compliance costs. 262 Let us
further assume that Section 404 is highly cost-ineffective and generates
only $1 of benefits to an issuer and its shareholders for every $3 of
direct costs incurred to comply with the regulation. Given such facts,
each of these companies will waste approximately $4 million over the
next five years for the right to be a reporting company. Further, that
Jan. 14, 2009).
254. SOUNDBITE COMMC’NS PROSPECTUS 424(b)(1), supra note 252, at cover page.
255. NANOSPHERE PROSPECTUS 424(b)(4), supra note 253, at cover page.
256. SOUNDBITE COMMUNICATIONS PROSPECTUS 424(b)(1), supra note 252, at cover
page.
257. NANOSPHERE PROSPECTUS 424(b)(4), supra note 253, at cover page.
258. SOUNDBITE COMMC’NS PROSPECTUS 424(b)(1), supra note 252, at 4 (multiplied
the common stock to be outstanding after the offering, or 14,993,843 shares excluding
the underwriters’ over-allotment option, by the public offering price of $8.00 per share).
259. NANOSPHERE PROSPECTUS 424(b)(4), supra note 253, at cover page, 6
(multiplied the common stock to be outstanding after the offering, or 21,118,970 shares
excluding the underwriters’ over-allotment option, by the public offering price of
$14.00 per share).
260. SOUNDBITE COMMC’NS REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-1/A (filed with
the SEC on Nov. 1, 2007), Part II, Item 13 at II-1, available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1163698/000095013507006582/b64836a8sv1za.htm.
261. NANOSPHERE REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-1/A (filed with the SEC
on Oct. 29, 2007), Part II, Item 13 at II-1, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1105184/000095013407022102/a32360a3sv1za.htm.
262. The assumption only projects out five years because, in this author’s past
experience working with smaller companies, they seldom do meaningful financial
forecasts beyond five years. It is unlikely, therefore, that regulatory costs beyond five
years are substantial motivators of their decisions.
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wasted $4 million represents 9.6% of SoundBite’s public issuance and
3.3% of its post-money IPO valuation, and 4.1% of Nanosphere’s public
issuance and 1.4% of its post-money IPO valuation.
(b) Counter Argument – Historical Lack of Price
Sensitivity by IPO Issuers
At first glance, it seems logical to conclude that adding $4 million
of additional expenses over a period of five years to what is already a
very expensive endeavor could explain the substantial drop in IPO activity by smaller companies. That $4 million could serve as the proverbial
“straw that breaks the camel’s back” 263 , the additional marginal cost that
renders being a public company too expensive for many smaller IPOeligible companies. Such a conclusion, however, suffers from a signifycant problem: companies that conduct IPOs tend not to be price sensitive
with respect to a few million dollars when making decisions about going
public.
There is a substantial amount of empirical support for this lack of
price sensitivity. The clearest example is the well-documented phenomenon of issuers “leaving money on the table” in IPOs. 264 In a firmcommitment underwritten IPO (which is the typical method of conducting an IPO), the issuer sells an allotment of its shares to the underwriters, who then sell those shares to the public. The price at which the

263. A more apt analogy might be Mr. Creosote, a fictional character from Monty
Python’s The Meaning of Life. Mr. Creosote is a morbidly-obese man who dines at a
French restaurant and proceeds to eat almost all of the food in the restaurant. At the
conclusion of his meal, Mr. Creosote states, “I couldn’t eat another thing. I am absolutely stuffed.” The maitre d’ convinces Mr. Creosote to eat a “wafer-thin mint” to
finish off his meal. The mint was one bite of food too many, and Mr. Creosote
explodes upon swallowing the mint. See Wikipedia, Mr. Creosote, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Mr._Creosote (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). Maybe the $4 million are the
equivalent of the mint?
264. See, e.g., Ritter, 2008 IPO Market, supra note 241, at 2; Tim Loughran & Jay
R. Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time? 33 FIN. MGMT. 5-37 (Fall
2004) [hereinafter Loughran & Ritter, IPO Underpricing]; Alexander Ljungqvist, IPO
Underpricing: A Survey, HANDBOOK IN CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE
FINANCE, B. Espen Eckbo, ed., (forthcoming, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
609422); Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why Don’t Issuers Get Upset About Leaving
Money on the Table in IPOs?, 15 REV. OF FIN. STUD., 413-43 (2002) [hereinafter
Loughran & Ritter, Money on the Table ]; Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO
Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795-1828 (2002).
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underwriters initially sell those shares to the public is the product of a
negotiation between the issuer’s senior management and the underwriters, and that price is not set until the night before public trading in
the shares is to commence. This pricing decision typically follows a
multi-week investor “road show” 265 and “book building” 266 process that
provide valuable information to the issuer and underwriters about the
probable demand for the issuer’s shares. In such a setting, one should
expect the initial offering price to the public to be fairly representative of
the public’s initial demand (i.e., the initial offering price should end up
being very close to the first-day closing price for the shares). In fact,
studies have documented that issuers consistently and systematically
leave money on the table when they agree to the initial offering price
with the underwriters, as IPO issuances frequently close the first day of
trading at a significant price increase from the initial offering price
(referred to as the “first-day IPO pop”), which means that the issuer “left
money on the table.” 267
“Money left on the table” is defined as “the first-day price gain
multiplied by the number of shares sold.” 268 Professors Loughran and
Ritter further explain the concept as follows:
If the shares had been sold at the closing market price rather than the
[initial] offer price, the proceeds of the offering would have been
higher by an amount equal to the money left on the table.
Alternatively, the same proceeds could have been raised by selling
fewer shares, resulting in less dilution of the preissue shareholders.
The [first-day] investors’ profits come out of the pocket of the
269
issuing company and its preissue shareholders.

Historically, issuers have left an enormous amount of money on the
table when pricing their IPOs. 270
265. The road show is the company’s marketing trip to investors that takes place
prior to setting the actual price for the offering. It typically involves a few of the company’s executive officers who try to explain to investors why their company will make a
good investment.
266. Book building is the process by which an underwriter attempts to determine at
what price to offer an IPO based on demand from prospective institutional investors, by
collecting non-binding commitments from prospective investors.
267. Ritter, 2008 IPO Market, supra note 241, at 2; Loughran & Ritter, Money on
the Table, supra note 264, at 413.
268. Loughran & Ritter, Money on the Table, supra note 264, at 413.
269. Id.
270. The table is derived from Ritter, 2008 IPO Market, supra note 241, at 2.
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Average
First-day
Return

Period

No. of
IPOs

Aggregate
Proceeds

2004 – 2007
2001 – 2003

651
209

$125.97 billion
$65.91 billion

$15.40 billion
$5.11 billion

12.2%
7.7%

1999 – 2000
1990 – 1998
1990 – 2006

859
3,573
5,292

$129.90 billion
$224.84 billion
$546.62 billion

$66.63 billion
$29.18 billion
$116.32 billion

51.3%
12.9%
21.3%

This money left on the table constitutes a substantial transfer of
wealth from the issuer and its pre-IPO shareholders to the new IPO
shareholders. 271 Interestingly, issuers seldom complain about money
left on the table following an IPO. Research has shown, for example,
that issuers who left large amounts of money on the table at their IPO do
not appear to hold that against the IPO underwriters when choosing
underwriters for a follow-on offering. 272 While there is no clear answer
as to why issuers and their pre-IPO shareholders are willing to leave so
much money on the table when they price their IPOs, 273 the fact remains
that such parties exhibit, on a not too infrequent basis, a lack of price
sensitivity when conducting IPOs. This lack of price sensitivity is so
substantial that it is plausible to wonder whether a few million dollar
increase over a five-year period is truly such a significant motivator for
an issuer contemplating an IPO.
Another powerful example of issuers’ lack of price sensitivity is the
general lack of price competition for many of the expenses that are
involved with conducting an IPO. Investment banks, for example, are
notorious for not competing based on price for underwriting business.
The typical underwriting discount for an IPO is seven percent. 274 While
the underwriting discount may vary somewhat based on the size of the
deal (e.g., extremely large deals will typically be conducted at a lesser
271.
272.

See id. at 414.
Laurie Krigman, Wayne H. Shaw & Kent L. Womack, Why do Firms Switch
Underwriters? 60 J. FIN. ECON. 245, 256-58 (2001).
273. For summaries of some of the more common theories for the IPO underpricing
phenomenon, see generally Loughran & Ritter, IPO Underpricing, supra note 264, and
Ljungqvist, supra note 264.
274. Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105,
1108 (2000).
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discount), investment banks will almost never vary that percentage in
order to win business. 275 This lack of price competition over the highest
direct cost involved with an IPO strongly suggests that issuers are not
price sensitive to a few million dollars. The same could be said about
legal fees associated with IPOs, where issuers similarly tend not be very
price sensitive when choosing outside counsel to assist with the IPO.
In the face of this lack of price sensitivity evidence, claims that
Section 404 has rendered IPOs unaffordable lose much of their force.
(c) Spotlight Hypothesis
IPOs for smaller companies did, however, drop substantially
following the introduction of SOX, during a period when the U.S. stock
markets showed significant growth. This Article offers an informal
theory to explain why price-insensitive issuers may have indeed reacted
to Section 404 when deciding whether to pursue an IPO.
As discussed above, a company should be expected to conduct an
IPO when: (1) the issuer’s growth opportunities require external
funding, (2) external funding can be obtained at a cost that is justified by
the expected returns from the growth opportunities, and (3) an IPO
provides the lowest cost of capital of the potential sources of capital. To
intelligently make such a calculation, an issuer must undertake a number
of difficult assessments. First, the issuer must competently forecast its
growth opportunities, which is inherently difficult since it involves
predicting the future. Thus, when calculating the cost of equity to
determine whether the growth opportunities justify the cost of capital,
the issuer should be aware that it is comparing the cost of capital against
a growth number that is likely to involve a significant degree of
inaccuracy. Second, the issuer must calculate the cost of obtaining
external capital – another inherently imprecise calculation, particularly
when trying to calculate the cost of equity from an IPO. Three broad
categories of factors impact the cost of equity from an IPO: (1) the
valuation the company achieves; (2) the various costs associated with
conducting the IPO; and (3) the ongoing maintenance costs associated
with being a publicly-traded company.
Company valuation: The valuation the company achieves (i.e., the
price at which the stock is sold to the public) will typically be the big275.

Orcutt, Investor Skepticism, supra note 55, at 17, n.76.
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gest factor in the company’s cost of equity. A myriad of factors impact
a company’s valuation, only some of which are in the company’s control, such as the company’s financial performance or the quality of its
management team. Others factors are outside the company’s control,
such as the condition of the public stock markets, the condition of the
IPO market, and whether the sector in which the issuer operates is in
demand at the time. To make the cost of equity calculation particularly
difficult for the issuer, the decision as to whether or not to conduct an
IPO will typically be based on a projected valuation range that is calculated many months before the IPO is actually conducted, which leaves
the issuer vulnerable to changes in those factors that are outside of its
control.
Costs associated with conducting the IPO: Numerous costs associated with conducting an IPO reduce the net proceeds the issuer will actually receive. Those costs include the underwriting discount, fees paid to
legal counsel and public auditors, the listing fees for the public stock
market on which the issuer’s stock will trade, printing and mailing fees,
transfer agent fees and the expenses involved with conducting the
investor roadshow.
Ongoing maintenance costs associated with being a publicly-traded
company: These costs include the various costs associated with being a
reporting company, including notably the costs of complying with the
Exchange Act’s disclosure requirements.
In total, a multitude of factors interacts to establish the eventual
cost of equity that an issuer achieves in an IPO. While it might be comforting to imagine an issuer’s management working through all of the
various factors and scenarios and attempting to make a precise mathematical calculation, such an outcome is unlikely. Even if an issuer’s
management can recognize each of the potential factors and understand
its potential impact (and few managers would be capable of doing that),
the probability of any particular outcome occurring is negligible. 276 This
Article offers an informal theory that, when faced with such a monu276. See generally DAVID DREMAN, CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES: THE
NEXT GENERATION 111 (1998). Dreman’s analysis focused on the securities analysts
and the fact that they are required to make a single, precise prediction while faced with
a multitude of factors that can lead to an almost infinite number of outcomes. Id.
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mental task, an issuer’s management will not try to conduct a detailed
cost of equity analysis, but instead will allow its decision-making to be
guided by one or more psychological heuristics. 277 For example, an
issuer’s management may fall prey to the “anchoring” 278 or
“focalism” 279 cognitive bias, focusing almost entirely on a few key
factors rather than trying to weigh all of them. Based on this author’s
experience as an investment banker and as IPO counsel, management
was generally very attentive to the impact of only a few of the cost of
equity factors when deciding whether or not to pursue an IPO. In
particular, management typically focused on the issuer’s forecasted
profits and the condition of the markets, without fully internalizing most
of the other factors, including the costs associated with conducting the
IPO and the ongoing maintenance costs associated with being a public
company. Moreover, management did not fully appreciate the impact of
the IPO underpricing that underwriters might seek at the time of the
actual IPO. Because management did not base the decision to pursue an
IPO on these other factors, these other factors were treated as incidental
expenses and were managed less aggressively, ultimately resulting in a
lack of price sensitivity.

277. “In psychology, heuristics are simple, efficient rules, hard-coded by evolutionary processes or learned, which have been proposed to explain how people make
decisions, come to judgments, and solve problems, typically when facing complex
problems or incomplete information. These rules work well under most circumstances,
but in certain cases lead to systematic cognitive biases.” Wikipedia, Heuristic, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heuristic (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). “Although much of
the work of discovering heuristics in human decision-makers has been done by Amos
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, the concept was originally introduced by Nobel
laureate Herbert Simon.” Id.
278. Professors Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman describe anchoring as follows:
In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is
adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial value, or starting point, may be
suggested by the formulation of the problem or it may be the result of a partial
computation. In either case, adjustments are typically insufficient. That is, different
starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values.
We call this phenomenon anchoring.

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974).
279. “Focalism” refers to the tendency to focus exclusively on a particularly salient
element without consideration of other potentially relevant information. HEURISTICS
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 295 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman, eds., 2002).
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Section 404 changed the above situation by causing an issuer’s
management to focus on the costs associated with conducting the IPO
and the ongoing maintenance costs associated with being a public company when deciding to conduct an IPO. All of the attention Section 404
has received has caused management to become much more cognizant
of the multitude of expenses that issuers conducting an IPO must face.
Thus, instead of being perceived as an incremental cost of $4 million
(per the earlier example), Section 404 may have helped management to
more fully internalize two entire categories of costs when deciding whether an IPO offers an appropriate cost of equity. Rather than fundamentally changing the cost of conducting an IPO, Section 404’s greater
impact – at least temporarily – may have been to change management’s
psychology in respect of those costs. Since Section 404 was the source
of this change in psychology, management ascribes to it a disproportionate amount of the blame.
Issuers with an IPO cost of equity that is not justified by the projected growth returns (or where the spread is only very slight) are now
more cognizant of the costs and should be more likely to seek an alternative source of capital, such as selling the company to a large strategic
acquirer or getting an investment from a private equity fund. Interestingly, the availability of these alternative sources of capital has increased substantially during the IPO lull for smaller companies, which
could indicate that the investment market is properly adjusting to a tight
IPO market for smaller companies. It is also worth noting that while a
vibrant IPO market for smaller companies can provide a number of
significant benefits (e.g., promoting a vibrant venture capital industry 280 ), over-dependence on IPOs as a financing tool for smaller companies can pose significant problems to social welfare. Such problems include sometimes encouraging an inappropriate risk transfer of higherrisk investments from investors that are specialized in such higher-risk
investments (e.g., venture capital funds) to less sophisticated public
investors, and motivating venture capitalists to engage in certain behaviors that have less positive implications for social welfare (e.g., shifting
their investments from early-stage investment to lower value-added latestage investing and over-investment in “hot” industry sectors to the
exclusion of other industry sectors). 281
280. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets: Banks versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 274 (1988).
281. See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 345-47 (2d
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Viewed in this light, the reduction in IPOs and their replacement by
alternative sources of financing might be positive. This author predicts,
however, that as the uproar over Section 404 quiets, its ability to focus
management on factors other than the core valuation factors will likely
wane and will soon have the negligible impact on IPO decision-making
that one would normally expect from only a few million dollars.
3. Increase in IPOs on Foreign Stock Markets
by Smaller U.S. Companies
One additional potential Section 404 avoidance strategy that has
received a fair amount of attention is the increase in IPOs on lessheavily regulated foreign stock markets by smaller U.S. companies. The
London Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (“AIM”) is
the foreign stock market that appears to have become the most viable
alternative for smaller U.S. companies. Touted as the “most successful
growth market in the world,” 282 AIM was launched in 1995 and at yearend 2007 had 1,634 listed companies with a total market capitalization
of over £94 billion. 283 Beginning in 2000, AIM became an option for
U.S. companies seeking to conduct an IPO. 284

ed. 2004)); see also Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 245, at 877-81.
282. London Stock Exchange, Company Services – AIM, http://www.londonstock
exchange.com/en-gb/products/companyservices/ourmarkets/aim_new/AIM (last visited
Jan. 14, 2009).
283. London Stock Exchange, AIM Market Statistics 1 (Dec. 2007),
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/B6293B90-1125-4591-9E32-C67
135B3EE4D/0/AIMMarketStatistics0712.pdf (last visited Jan. 114, 2008).
284. VC Experts.com, VC Encyclopedia, AIM International Fact Sheet – USA (July
2007), http://vcexperts.com/files/encyclopedia/2825/us_aim_international_fact_sheet.
pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2009) [hereinafter AIM International Fact Sheet – USA]. Prior
to 2000, only one U.S. company conducted an IPO on AIM. The U.S. company was
Reflec, a chemical company, that listed on AIM in May 1997. Id.
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25
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9
3
2
1
1
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Aggregate Market
Capitalization at Admission
$3,216.4 million
$2,908.7 million
$444.0 million
$161.9 million
$125.5 million
$34.8 million
$18.9 million

One possible interpretation of the AIM phenomenon is that smaller
U.S. companies are raising equity capital on AIM because it offers them
a lower cost of equity due to the lower regulatory costs involved with an
AIM listing (including the fact that regulations governing AIM listings
do not include a Section 404 type of provision). For this interpretation
to be plausible, however, it requires that the smaller U.S. companies
who conducted their IPOs on AIM were attractive enough to conduct an
IPO on a U.S. stock market. Otherwise, the companies are not making a
choice between AIM and the U.S. stock markets. For example, companies wishing to list on the NASDAQ Global Market are effectively required to have a market capitalization of $50 million. 285 To attract meaningful interest from U.S. underwriters and investors, however, the
threshold is more likely to be a market capitalization of at least $100
million at admission. The following table sets forth market capitalization figures for the U.S. companies that conducted IPOs on AIM from
2004 – 2006. 286

2006
2005
2004
Total

285.
286.

Total No. of
U.S.
companies
that
conducted
IPOs on AIM
25
18
9
52

Aggregate
market
capitalization at
admission

$3,216.4 million
$2,908.7 million
$444.0 million
$6,569.1 million

No. with
market
capitalization
of $50 million
or more at
admission
18
14
2
34

NASD Marketplace Rules 4420(b), 4450(b).
AIM International Fact Sheet – USA, supra note 284.

No. with
market
capitalization
of $100 million
or more at
admission
10
10
2
22
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The result is that less than half of the companies that listed on AIM
had a realistic ability to conduct an underwritten IPO in the United
States. Instead, 22 companies over a three-year period may have made
the choice to conduct an AIM IPO in order to escape potentially costineffective U.S. securities regulation. This is no mass exodus. In considering the decision of the 22 companies that initially chose to list on
AIM rather than a U.S. stock market, it is worth noting that cost savings
may not have been the only – or even the dominant – factor in their
decision making. The private benefits hypothesis 287 and the spotlight
hypothesis 288 are also very plausible explanations for their decisions.
Interestingly, of the 52 U.S. companies that conducted an AIM IPO
between 2004 and 2006: seven are currently Exchange Act reporting
companies, 289 one has gone on to list on the NASDAQ Global Select
Market, 290 one has gone on to list on the NASDAQ Capital Market, 291
and two have gone on to list on AMEX. 292
C. Net Effect of Section 404 Remains Unclear
Overall, Section 404’s net effect on smaller companies remains
unclear. There does not appear to be any question that Section 404 is
costly and disproportionately more expensive for smaller companies
than for larger companies. However, Section 404 is not without significant potential benefits, and it is possible that those benefits exceed its
significant compliance costs. Unfortunately, Section 404’s benefits are
difficult to calculate with any level of precision, which renders a simple
cost-benefit analysis for Section 404 nearly impossible to conduct.
Furthermore, the available anecdotal evidence fairs no better at defini-

287.
288.
289.

See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.c(2).
See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.c.
Analysis updated through Mar. 1, 2008: The seven companies are: Allied
Healthcare International Inc., Elcom International, Inc., Energy XXI (Bermuda)
Limited, Enova Systems, Inc., FutureFuel Corp., Spearhead Limited, Inc., and UTEK
Corporation.
290. Analysis updated through Mar. 1, 2008: Allied Healthcare Int’l Inc., http://
www.alliedhealthcare.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
291. Analysis updated through Mar. 1, 2008: Energy XXI (Bermuda) Limited,
http://www.energyxxi.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
292. Analysis updated through Mar. 1, 2008: UTEK Corporation, http://www.utek
corp.com (last visited Dec. 27, 2008); Enova Systems, Inc., http://www.enovasystems.
com (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
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tively resolving whether Section 404 is ultimately cost-effective or costineffective for smaller companies.
In the face of this uncertainty, what should federal policymakers do
about Section 404 and its application to smaller public companies?
PART V: WHAT SHOULD FEDERAL POLICYMAKERS DO IN THE FACE OF
THIS UNCERTAINTY?
The SEC has not ignored Section 404’s potential negative impact
on smaller companies. For example, the SEC has implemented Section
404 slowly in order to give smaller reporting companies time to adjust. 293 It has also tried to make management’s and auditors’ evaluations
of ICFRs more effective and efficient by amending the rules relating to
management’s evaluation of ICFR, issuing interpretative guidance that
management can use as a safe harbor in its evaluation of ICFRs, and
adopting revised auditing standards. 294 The question remains, however:
Should Congress and the SEC do more?
A. Exempting Smaller Reporting Companies from Section 404
This Article considers whether Congress and the SEC should
exempt smaller reporting companies from Section 404 compliance.
Such exemption could come in several different forms. Three of the
more commonly suggested methods for exempting smaller reporting
companies from Section 404 are as follows:
Complete Exemption: Smaller reporting companies under a certain
size-threshold could be completely relieved from complying with
Section 404.
Opt-out Approach: Smaller reporting companies could be subject to
Section 404, but would also be allowed the ability to “opt out” of
Section 404. 295

293.
294.
295.

See supra Part I.C.
Id.
Professors Butler and Ribstein have proposed such an opt-out solution for
Section 404. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 88-90.

2009

THE CASE AGAINST EXEMPTING
SMALLER REPORTING COMPANIES

401

Eliminate the Auditor Attestation Requirement: Since auditor
attestation fees make up a substantial portion of Section 404’s compliance costs, 296 some have suggested eliminating the external audit of the
effectiveness of a reporting company’s ICFR as a means to reduce
Section 404’s compliance costs for smaller reporting companies. 297
B. Exemption Proposals Offer a Market-Based Solution to Determine
whether Section 404 is Cost-Effective
The exemption proposals do have some appeal, as they offer a
market-based resolution to the uncertain value of Section 404. In each
case, smaller companies would be relieved (either completely or substantially) from mandatory compliance with Section 404, but would retain the ability to voluntarily choose to comply with Section 404 if they
found it to be cost-effective. Market-based solutions can be attractive
because they help to address the inherent allocation problems that exist
for the services provided by the U.S. securities regulatory system. The
U.S. securities regulatory system provides a variety of services – such as
rule making, monitoring and supervision – to various stakeholders in the
securities markets, 298 including issuers of securities, broker-dealers, investors and even the public at large. While there is some debate as to
the ultimate goal of securities regulation, 299 the more typically cited
goals of the formal regulatory system include:

296.
297.

See discussion supra Part III.B.
See, e.g., Mark G. Heesen, President, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, Comment
on Proposed ICFR Rules, Standards and Guidance: SEC File No. S7-24-06, PCAOB
Docket Matter No. 021, at 10-11 (Feb. 23, 2007), available at http://www.nvca.org/pdf
/NVCA_SEC_PCAOB404.pdf.
298. David Llewellyn, The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation 6 (FSA
Occasional Papers in Financial Regulation, Apr. 1999), available at http://www.fsa.gov.
uk/pubs/occpapers/OP01.pdf.
299. The most commonly cited rationales for securities regulation are investor protection and enhancing market efficiency. See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Richard Herring,
Banking Regulation versus Securities Market Regulation 2 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 01-29, 2001). But see, Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky,
The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006). The authors
assert that protection of the common investor is an antiquated goal of securities
regulation and that the more appropriate goal of securities regulation is to “create a
competitive market for sophisticated professional investors and analysts (information
traders).” Id. at 711.

402

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW
•

•
•

•

Vol. XIV

to reduce market problems such as information asymmetries or
agency problems that either (i) expose members of the public to
inappropriate risk that they are not capable of properly evaluating, or (ii) reduce the efficiency of a securities market;
to provide the economies of scale to reduce numerous collective
action problems that plague widely dispersed investors;
to help to reduce the impact of potential “lemons problems” that
are inherent to securities markets by signaling or establishing
minimum standards of quality; and/or
to allow expert regulators to standardize certain procedures,
which could lead to lower transaction costs for issuers, investors
and market professionals. 300

Presumably, Section 404 provides a service that addresses in some
manner many, if not all, of the above goals. Unlike most goods or services, however, the services provided by the formal securities regulatory
system are not supplied through a market process, which can lead to a
number of serious allocation problems for the securities regulatory
services. 301 For example, information can be lost about the amount and
type of regulation that various consumers desire, the price the consumers
are willing to pay for the regulation, and the changes in the cost of the
regulation that may occur over time. 302 Overall, the lack of market process increases the likelihood that a sub-optimal level of regulation will
be provided – with certain matters being over-regulated while other
matters are under-regulated. It is this allocation problem that drives the
complaints lodged by critics that Section 404’s application to smaller
companies “goes too far.” No one argues that improving ICFRs for
smaller reporting companies is undesirable; instead, critics contest that
Section 404 involves over-regulation, as “too much” of this service is
provided to the relevant stakeholders. Presumably, the critics believe
300. For a thoughtful overview of various reasons for financial regulation (including
reducing market problems, providing economies of scale and addressing lemons
problems), see Llewellyn, supra note 298, at 21-26. Llewellyn’s analysis had a particular focus on banking regulation, but is also applicable to securities regulation. With
regards to lowering transaction costs by standardizing procedures, Regulation S-K
provides a good example. In theory, Regulation S-K's standardization of disclosure
should reduce the costs (i) to issuers of furnishing information and (ii) to market
professionals and investors of analyzing and comparing the information.
301. Llewellyn, supra note 298, at 6.
302. See id.

2009

THE CASE AGAINST EXEMPTING
SMALLER REPORTING COMPANIES

403

that smaller company shareholders would not pay for the Section 404
service if given the choice, because the cost of the service outweighs the
benefit.
In a market-based setting, such an allocation problem works itself
out through consumers expressing their demand for a service either by
purchasing or not purchasing the service. In the regulatory setting, regulations are less clearly bought and sold, which makes it much more difficult to identify consumers’ actual demand for the service. The proposals
help to address the allocation problem by providing a market-based
mechanism for smaller reporting companies to decide whether to
“purchase” (i.e., voluntarily adopt) Section 404. If managers of smaller
reporting companies act to maximize shareholder value, one should
expect them to: (1) voluntarily choose to comply with Section 404 if it
proves to be cost-effective, since it would have a net positive impact on
shareholder value, or (2) avoid Section 404 if it is cost-ineffective, since
it would have a net negative impact.
C. A Model for Analyzing the Probable Impact of Exempting Smaller
Reporting Companies from Section 404
While empowering smaller reporting companies with such marketbased regulatory solutions seems appealing at first glance, this Article
posits that structural factors within the public securities markets for
smaller reporting companies will prevent such market-based proposals
from achieving such a beneficial allocation outcome. 303 Instead, the proposed Section 404 relief proposals are more likely to increase information asymmetries for smaller reporting companies, with the risk of these
greater information asymmetries being borne almost entirely by unsophisticated ordinary investors.

303. This reminds the author of Myron Scholes’ (co-author of the famous BlackScholes equation for valuing options) famous quote that “markets look a lot more
efficient from the banks of the Charles than from the banks of the Hudson.” John
Gapper, A Mathematician with a Mission, FT.COM (FINANCIAL TIMES), Sept. 11, 2005,
available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/clips/2005/09/12/AMathematicianFT.
pdf. The idea behind the quote is that while academic theories involving efficient
markets can often appear to provide clean and simple approaches to a given financial
problem, applying those efficiency theories to actual markets can be much more
complicated.
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1. Foundational Premises
This Article constructs a model for analyzing the probable impact
of granting Section 404 relief to smaller reporting companies. In
constructing the model, this Article relies on three foundational
premises, each of which will be explained in greater detail below:
•
•
•

The strength of a company’s ICFR is significant to the overall
value of that company’s securities;
The strength of ICFRs varies widely among smaller reporting
companies; and
The primary external security holders for smaller reporting companies are ordinary investors whose overall level of investment
sophistication is generally quite low.
(a) Information About the Strength of a Company’s ICFR
is Significant to the Value of its Securities

As discussed earlier, a reporting company’s financial disclosure
ranks among the most important information for pricing its securities. 304
Since companies with stronger ICFRs should provide more accurate
financial disclosure than companies with weaker ICFRs, such stronger
companies should receive more favorable valuations; conversely, the
weaker companies should receive less favorable valuations. Assuming
two companies that are similar in all respects except for the strength of
their ICFRs, securities of the company with the weaker ICFRs should
trade at a discount to securities of the stronger company (an “ICFR
Discount”), as investors should treat the greater risk of inaccurate
financial disclosure as though it were an additional “cost” in making the
investment.
(b) Strength of ICFRs Varies Widely Among
Smaller Reporting Companies
The strength of ICFRs varies widely among smaller reporting companies. Some smaller reporting companies should be expected to have
relatively strong ICFRs, while others will have very weak ICFRs.
Moreover, Orphan SRCs dominate the number of smaller reporting com-

304.

See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
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panies, and these Orphan SRCs pose a substantial risk for weak ICFRs.
Orphan SRCs have little to no meaningful institutional and secondary
support, which means these companies have few effective external
mechanisms for monitoring their performance, including the strength of
their ICFRs. 305
(c) Predominance and Vulnerability of Ordinary Investors
For a market-based approach to investor-protection regulations to
work properly, the investors who are empowered with the choice of
whether or not to encourage their companies to “purchase” the regulation must have the rationality and capacity to: (1) recognize that they
have such a choice, (2) evaluate that choice intelligently, and (3) price
the impact of that choice into the price of the security. Investors,
however, are not a homogenous group. Different investors have different levels of sophistication, including the ability to account for and
evaluate the various factors that go into the price of a given security.
For illustrative purposes, this Article will oversimplify the matter and
group investors into two broad categories: institutional investors and
ordinary investors. Institutional investors, such as mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, investment banks, or other entities who
regularly invest large amounts of money in the securities markets, are
generally sophisticated investors; they have both the rationality and
capacity to intelligently investigate and value securities investments.
More specifically, institutional investors have the capacity to: (1)
identify and obtain the information they need in order to intelligently
evaluate the worth of a given security, (2) evaluate that information, (3)
recognize when they receive questionable information or lack sufficient
information, and appropriately account for such questionable or missing
information (e.g., by discounting the price they will pay for the securities investment), and (4) understand and internalize the risks involved
with investing in securities.
Ordinary investors are basically everyone other than institutional
investors. Smaller reporting companies in general, and Orphan SRCs in
particular, tend to have much less institutional shareholder ownership
than large reporting companies. For smaller reporting companies, ordinary investors are likely to play a much more significant role. This
heavy ordinary shareholder ownership is problematic for market-based
305.

See supra Part II.B.
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regulatory approaches because ordinary investors have historically
demonstrated an inability to intelligently investigate and value securities
investments. In fact, the federal mandatory disclosure system was designed primarily to protect ordinary investors, 306 not only because they
suffer from the typical informational disadvantage that all investors
face, 307 but also because ordinary investors are generally so unsophisticated that they do not recognize the magnitude of their informational
disadvantage, and therefore do not sufficiently discount the value of
securities offered them to compensate for this informational disadvantage. 308
2. Exemption Proposals would Increase Informational Asymmetries for
Smaller Reporting Companies at the Expense of Ordinary Investors
If this Article’s foundational premises in Part V.C.1 are correct,
granting smaller reporting companies relief from Section 404 should
increase informational asymmetries between those companies and their
ordinary investors. Moreover, the informational asymmetries will im-

306. See, e.g., Proposed Rules: Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method
of Determining Holding Period of Restricted Securities under Rules 144 and 145,
Release No. 33-6806 (Oct. 25, 1988) at *10-11.
307. See Paul G. Mahoney, Technology, Property Rights in Information, and
Securities Regulation, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 815, 842 (1997).
308. See id. at 842. In 2003, the NASD conducted an investor survey that strongly
suggests that ordinary investors’ general lack of sophistication persists today. NASD
Investor Literacy Research (Executive Summary), Prepared by Applied Research &
Consulting LLC (2003), http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/surveyeyecsum.pdf; see also
NASD News Release, NASD Announces $10-Million Education Fund – Investor
Survey Underscores Importance of Education (Dec. 2, 2003), available at http:// www.
nasdr.com/news/pr2003/release_03_054.html [hereinafter NASD News Release]. In
the survey, the NASD “asked 1,086 [ordinary] investors more than 50 basic . . .
questions about investing in stocks, bonds and mutual funds.” NASD News Release.
Some of the more shocking findings of the survey include:
• Nearly 50 percent [of respondents] thought stock market losses were insured.
• Seventy percent of investors failed to understand that when you buy on margin,
you can lose all of your investment even if the value of your shares does not go
to zero.
• Nearly 80 percent did not understand fully the meaning of “no load” mutual
funds.
Id.
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pose significant costs on those ordinary investors as they are unlikely to
appreciate the magnitude of the asymmetries. 309
To illustrate why one should expect an increase in informational
asymmetries, let us assume for simplicity’s sake that there are two kinds
of smaller reporting companies: 310 those with weak ICFRs (and the least
accurate financial disclosure) and those with strong ICFRs (and the most
accurate financial disclosure). The market response to this different
quality of ICFRs should be one of pricing. 311 Assuming that the market
price for smaller reporting companies is established primarily by sophisticated investors, such sophisticated investors could simply demand a
higher forecasted return (i.e., they would pay a lower price for the
securities) when investing in a smaller reporting company with weak
ICFRs to compensate for the increased risk of inaccurate financial disclosure. 312 Unfortunately, it is inherently difficult to accurately identify
the strength of a given smaller reporting company’s ICFR; the information needed to make that determination is possessed by the company’s managers and is difficult to communicate to investors in a verifiable manner absent some type of certification process. Where sophisticated investors are incapable of distinguishing which smaller reporting
companies have weak or strong ICFRs, one should expect the sophisticated investors to discount the securities prices for all smaller reporting
companies 313 by some amount to approximate the overall risk of that
category of investment. The investors’ inability to identify which
smaller reporting companies are riskier (and which are less risky) gives
rise to a classic lemons problem, 314 as investors will likely establish a
discount rate that is overly harsh for companies with strong ICFRs (i.e.,
they will over-discount these companies and under-pay for their
securities). Conversely, investors will likely establish an overly generous
discount rate for companies with weak ICFRs (i.e., they will underdiscount these companies and over-pay for their securities). The result is
309. See generally David T. Llewellyn, Regulation of Retail Investment Services, 15
ECON. AFFAIRS 12 (1995) (in examining the banking market, Llewellyn explains why a
regulation-free environment imposes costs on retail consumer who are unsophisticated
about the financial products sold by banks).
310. This model is based on Dr. Akerlof’s model for used cars in Akerlof, supra
note 240, at 489-92.
311. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 44, at 272.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id.
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that a less than optimal amount of investment capital flows to smaller
reporting companies that are stronger, while too much capital flows to
those that are weaker.
Stronger companies are penalized by this effect, which should
motivate them to clearly differentiate themselves from weaker companies. For example, if the market for smaller reporting companies was
dominated by sophisticated investors, a company with stronger ICFRs
could signal that strength by voluntarily adopting Section 404, thereby
causing the sophisticated investors to reduce the ICFR Discount they
apply to that company. Where the excess discount charged to a smaller
reporting company with stronger ICFRs exceeds the cost of Section 404
compliance, one should expect that company to voluntarily adopt
Section 404. Presumably, the Section 404 compliance costs for those
smaller reporting companies with stronger ICFRs would be lower than
for weaker companies, so the stronger companies would be highly motivated to adopt Section 404 and distinguish themselves. This would help
investors to both better identify those companies with stronger ICFRs
and those with weaker ICFRs, thus further increasing the ICFR Discount
charged to those companies.
The above analysis is based on the assumption that the market for
smaller reporting companies is dominated by sophisticated investors
who understand the impact of ICFRs and Section 404, and who can both
intelligently evaluate the situation and ascribe a value to the smaller
reporting company’s decision to voluntarily comply with, or not comply
with, Section 404. In fact, however, the market for smaller reporting
companies is dominated by unsophisticated ordinary investors, which
significantly alters the analysis. Unlike sophisticated investors, ordinary
investors should be expected to suffer from a number of problems that
reduce their ability to serve as an optimal market feedback mechanism:
•

•

There is a significant risk that ordinary investors will not
recognize they are making a choice about the value of ICFRs
and Section 404 when making an investment decision regarding
a smaller reporting company;
Even if ordinary investors recognize they are making a choice
about the value of ICFRs and Section 404, there is a significant
risk that they do not adequately understand the function of
ICFRs or how Section 404 helps to address that issue. In short,
their decisions on the matter are likely to be uninformed; and/or
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As noted above, ordinary investors have historically shown an
inability to sufficiently discount the value of securities when
faced with exactly the type of information asymmetry that exists
regarding the strength of a smaller reporting company’s ICFR.

Moreover, the probability that ordinary investors would largely
miss the point about the importance of ICFRs would be increased by any
relief proposal, as such relief proposal could easily be interpreted by
ordinary investors as a signal that policymakers do not consider ICFRs
all that important for smaller reporting companies. In sum, this Article
predicts that ordinary investors would apply an ICFR discount that is
substantially too low.
Such a scenario should deter smaller reporting companies with
strong ICFRs from pursuing strategies that clearly signal the strength of
their ICFRs (such as voluntarily adopting Section 404), because the
inappropriately low ICFR discount applied by ordinary investors reduces
the benefit for strong ICFR companies to pursue such signaling
strategies. Unless the cost of the signaling strategy is very low, it becomes cost-ineffective for strong ICFR companies to pursue such strategies. Therefore, while clear signaling efforts would help to increase the
overall efficiency of the market for smaller reporting company
securities, such signaling is unlikely to occur. The greatest beneficiary
of this lack of clear signaling by strong ICFR companies is the weak
ICFR companies. Without a clear mechanism for highlighting those
companies with weaker ICFRs, weak ICFR companies can sell their securities at prices that are inappropriately advantageous for the weaker
companies and inappropriately disadvantageous for the ordinary investors.
In short, making Section 404 voluntary for smaller reporting
companies would not provide significant value to smaller reporting companies with strong ICFRs. In fact, it could prove detrimental to these
companies, as the securities market for smaller reporting companies
should be expected to encourage companies with weaker ICFRs (since
they would receive an inappropriately advantageous cost of capital),
which could eventually result in a lemons problem for this market.
Indeed, it could be that such a lemons problem helps to explain why
currently, institutional investors are less likely to invest in smaller
reporting companies than are ordinary investors. Instead, the greatest
benefit from such relief would flow instead to smaller reporting companies with weak ICFRs. Finally, the cost of assisting those smaller
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reporting companies with weak ICFRs would be borne unknowingly,
and primarily, by ordinary investors who would be paying too much for
the securities of these companies.
D. Mandatory Section 404 Compliance for Smaller Reporting
Companies Reduces Informational Asymmetries
Mandatory Section 404 compliance for smaller reporting companies
helps to resolve such problems by reducing informational asymmetries
about the strength of their ICFRs. In general, where a securities market
is dominated by unsophisticated ordinary investors, greater informational asymmetries and agency problems will arise because ordinary investors (1) will find it difficult to determine the quality of the information
provided and (2) are less capable of effectively monitoring management. 315 Where that very same market also lacks meaningful institutional and secondary support, the problem is exacerbated due to a lack of
collective investment in information gathering and monitoring services.
In such a scenario, explicit, mandatory federal securities regulation can
help to reduce these problems by having the federal government replace
unsophisticated investors as the primary determinant of what level of
reporting and monitoring services should be provided. Regarding
Section 404 specifically, unsophisticated, ordinary investors are not
well-equipped to intelligently investigate and evaluate the strength of a
company’s ICFR and there is little institutional or secondary support to
otherwise help deal with the problem. Therefore, requiring compliance
with Section 404 addresses the expected informational asymmetry by
establishing a minimum standard for ICFRs.
It must be pointed out, however, that mandatory regulatory solutions are never problem free. As noted earlier, the fact that mandatory
regulation is not subject to a market process increases the likelihood that
a sub-optimal level of regulation will be provided; certain matters
become over-regulated while others remain under-regulated. Even
though the SEC is a highly-specialized regulatory body that should be
much more sophisticated than most ordinary investors, there remains the
risk that the SEC will not establish the optimal minimal standards for
ICFR disclosure and monitoring. 316 While such a regulatory allocation
315. See generally Llewellyn, supra note 309 (making a similar argument for retail
bank customers).
316. See GEORGE J. BENTSON, REGULATING FINANCIAL MARKETS – A CRITIQUE AND
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problem is in no way insignificant, this Article suggests that experimentation with market-based proposals to overcome that problem be
conducted first in markets where ordinary investors are less vulnerable.
Thus, ironically, it is larger reporting companies who have the stronger
case for exemption from Section 404, as their public securities markets
are dominated by securities intermediaries and sophisticated institutional
investors who can serve as an accurate market feedback mechanism for
the value of Section 404 (with ordinary investors free riding on the
expertise and efforts of these more sophisticated parties).
Regulations that have a significant consumer protection aspect also
can give rise to a potential “moral hazard” problem. 317 The recipients of
the consumer protection (in this case ordinary investors) may be led to
believe that the regulated parties (in this case smaller reporting companies) have been made safe and that less care need be taken when dealing
with the regulated parties. 318 There is no easy answer to this moral hazard problem. Federal policymakers must take care to properly manage
the expectations of recipients of consumer protection initiatives. Regulatory initiatives should never eliminate an investor’s incentive to exercise due care, 319 and that message should be clearly and regularly communicated to investors.
E. Manner of Exemption Could Impact Analysis
The analysis in Part V.C.2 assumes that smaller reporting companies are granted a complete exemption from Section 404. Such analysis
could be materially impacted if federal policymakers decide to provide
smaller reporting companies a less complete exemption to Section 404.
Consider, for example, if federal policymakers pursue an “opt-out” approach, or eliminate the auditor attestation requirement for smaller reporting companies.
An opt-out approach to Section 404 could avoid some of the information asymmetry problems that would likely arise from a complete
exemption approach. The benefit of an opt-out approach is that it could
be structured so as to require companies wishing to opt out of Section

SOME PROPOSALS 48 (1999) (making a similar criticism of government agencies’ ability
to establish disclosure standards for banking customers).
317. See Llewellyn, supra note 298, at 51.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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404 to undergo a formal shareholder approval process. For example,
assume that the opt-out is conditioned upon the smaller reporting
company amending its certificate of incorporation to eliminate the corporation’s responsibility for complying with Section 404. As a matter of
state corporate law, such an amendment would require that the company’s board adopt the proposed amendment and submit it to the shareholders for approval. 320 The board would also be required to make a
recommendation to the shareholders to adopt the amendment. 321 The
opt-out approach would not cure the predominance and vulnerability of
ordinary shareholders, but it would at least provide a very clear signal to
the existing ordinary shareholders of the ICFR issue and would require
the directors to make proxy disclosure on the advisability of the opt-out
that would subject them to potential anti-fraud liability under Exchange
Act Rule 14a-9 322 if their disclosure contained a false or misleading
statement. Therefore, it is at least possible that the opt-out approach
would: (1) make the exemption process so public that ordinary investors
would be spurred to provide a more appropriate ICFR discount to companies that seek to avoid Section 404; or (2) that the burdens of the optout process would be sufficient to motivate a significant number of companies to comply with Section 404, allowing Section 404 compliance to
serve as a clear signal of the strength of a company’s ICFR.
If the Section 404 exemption proposal is limited to exempting
smaller reporting companies from the auditor attestation requirement, it
is theoretically possible that such exemption strategy could have a less
drastic outcome than is predicted in Part V.C.2. It could be that the
Section 404(a) management report on ICFR alone will dramatically improve ICFRs at smaller reporting companies such that the ICFR discount
is sufficiently lowered without the need for the costly auditor attestations. While possible, this author is highly skeptical of such an outcome. As noted above, since the securities markets for smaller reporting
companies are dominated by unsophisticated ordinary investors and lack
meaningful institutional or secondary support, these companies receive
less monitoring services which makes them ripe for just the type of
agency problems that necessitate external audits generally. Even for

320. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242; MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT §
10.03.
321. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242; MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT §
10.03.
322. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9.
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larger companies, which do have substantial external monitoring services, external audits appear to have been necessary to push management to find and disclose material weaknesses in their ICFRs. 323
It is “possible,” then, that a less than complete exemption “could”
avoid some of the information asymmetry problems predicted in Part
V.C.2. Because the risk of under-regulation would be borne primarily,
and unknowingly, by unsophisticated ordinary investors, the burden for
establishing that the more tailored exemption is socially beneficial
should be placed on the party proposing the exemption. Therefore,
rather than continue to delay full implementation of Section 404 for all
reporting companies until it is proven that Section 404 is cost-effective,
which roughly describes the current treatment of Section 404 for nonaccelerated filers, this Article concludes that the threat to ordinary
investors is so substantial that the burden should be switched to those
seeking delays or modifications to Section 404’s implementation.
PART VI: CONCLUSION
This Article recommends that smaller reporting companies not be
exempted from Section 404. While a market-based solution to the
Section 404 cost-benefit debate is intuitively appealing, this Article
demonstrates why exempting smaller reporting companies from Section
404 and allowing market forces to resolve the need for ICFR services is
an inherently unworkable solution. Because the market for smaller
reporting companies is dominated by Orphan SRCs and unsophisticated
ordinary investors, exempting smaller reporting companies from Section
404 is likely to increase information asymmetries between smaller reporting companies and their ordinary investor shareholders (who have
historically demonstrated themselves to be particularly vulnerable to this
type of information asymmetry). Rather than improve the allocation of
ICFR services, exempting smaller reporting companies from Section
404 would almost certainly guarantee an insufficient level of ICFR
323. See Letter from Lynn E. Turner, Managing Dir., Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 5-6 (Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/4-497/leturner041205.pdf. Turner notes that “a record number of errors
in financial statements . . . in the fourth quarter of 2004. . . . While the increased
transparency and improvement in internal controls is a positive development, we must
highlight that many of the Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officers of
these same companies had previously certified to their investors that their internal
controls were operating effectively.” Id.
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services for smaller reporting companies, with the cost for that insufficient dedication of resources being borne primarily and unknowingly by
unsophisticated ordinary investors.
While mandatory Section 404 regulation helps to address the problem of smaller reporting companies under-investing resources in their
ICFRs, it must be remembered that the mandatory regulation approach
suffers from its own problems. In the case of Section 404, the uncertain
net effect of Section 404 still needs to be addressed. Tailoring Section
404 to meet the particular needs of smaller reporting companies and
their security holders will need to be conducted by the SEC and the
PCAOB, rather than naturally occur through a market-based process.
Moreover, the risk of ordinary investors falling prey to a moral hazard
problem must continue to be monitored. If the choice, however, is between an increased risk of marginal over-regulation (and/or marginally
misplaced regulation) versus smaller reporting companies almost
certainly under-investing resources in their ICFRs and exposing ordinary
investors to significantly increased investment risk without their realizing it, the preference should be for mandatory regulation and its
shortcomings.

